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California Supreme Court Survey
March 1986-May 1986
The CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey is a briefsynopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the readerof the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
startingpoint for researchingany of the topical areas. The decisions are analyzed in accordancewith the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline cases
have been omitted from the survey.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE ........................................

Disposition of the award residue of class action
suits is a matter properly within the discretion of
the trial court. Under the doctrine of 'fluid
recovery," the trial court has the option of using a
price rollback, general or special escheat, consumer
trustfunds, or claimantfund sharing: State of
California v. Levi Strauss & Co ........................
II.

CRIMINAL LAW ...........................................

The question of whether a promissory note is a
security within the meaning of the Corporations
Code, for the purposes of a criminal charge, is a
question for the jury, not the court, no matter how
much evidence exists, and the burden of proving an
exemption to securitiesregulationsfor the
defendant is to raise a reasonable doubt that the
security is not required to be registered: People v.
Figueroa ..............................................
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ...................................

A. Mandatory imposition offull, separateand
consecutive prison terms pursuant to section
667.6(d) of the CaliforniaPenal Code for
perpetrationof sex offenses against the same victim
on "separateoccasions" requires a finding that the
perpetratortemporarily lost or abandoned the
opportunity to continue his attack: People v. Craft..
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I.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Disposition of the award residue of class action suits is a
matter properly within the discretion of the trial court.
Under the doctrine of 'fluid recovery," the trial court
has the option of using a price rollback, general or
special escheat, consumer trustfunds, or claimantfund
sharing: State of California v. Levi Strauss & Co.

In State of Californiav. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 715 P.2d
564, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605, modified, 41 Cal. 3d 860(a) (1986), the court
interpreted and reviewed the doctrine of "fluid recovery" as applied
to plaintiffs' damage awards in class action suits. Under the doctrine
of cy pres, if the terms of a charitable trust become impossible to
comply with, a court may put the trust's funds to "the next best use,"
in accordance with the donor's original intent. This doctrine is sometimes used by courts to distribute the awards in class actions, and in
that context is referred to as the doctrine of "fluid recovery."
In this case, the court set out four factors that trial courts should
consider in choosing a particular method of "fluid recovery": 1) the
amount of compensation provided to class members; 2) the proportion of class members sharing in the recovery; 3) the extent to which
nonclass members will benefit and the effect such a benefit will have
on the underlying substantive law; and 4) the costs of administering
the distribution of the award. The court held that fluid recovery is
not precluded in private antitrust class actions by the parens patriae
statute. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16760 (West Supp. 1986). See also
Bruno v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342
(1981).
Pursuant to an administrative complaint issued by the Federal
Trade Commission alleging antitrust violations against Levi Strauss
& Co., the Attorney General of the State of California sought to recover damages for residents of the state. A settlement was agreed
upon and an intervenor objected to the Attorney General's plan for
the distribution of the $12.5 million which was received as damages.
The intervenor alleged that the Attorney General's plan would not
compensate members of the class, that nonmembers of the class
would benefit from the plan, and that the administration of the
payback plan would be excessively expensive. The intervenor was repeatedly rebuffed by the lower court and most of the intervenor's objections were not made part of the lower court's record and were
thus not reviewed by the supreme court.
The supreme court noted at the outset of its decision that $1.5 million of the fund had already been spent on the Attorney General's
distribution plan. At oral argument, the intervenor conceded that
the claims filed and accepted by the Attorney General should be paid
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to the claimants and the court used this as a rationale to uphold the
settlement as negotiated by the Attorney General. The court upheld
the settlement as a whole. The court cited to precedent that in class
actions, the court must approve the settlement as a whole, unless it is
possible to determine that the parties considered different portions of
the agreement to be independent. See Trotsky v. Los Angeles Federal
Savings & Loan Association, 48 Cal. App. 3d 134, 153, 121 Cal. Rptr.
637, 649 (1975).
In an effort to provide guidance to the lower courts, the court discussed the "consumer trust fund" as a method of "fluid recovery" in
class actions. First, the court described the general development of
"fluid recovery" in class actions as it developed from the doctrine of
cy pres. Second, the court discussed the various methods of "fluid recovery" and their overall effect on the compensation of the class.
The court ended its discussion by comparing and contrasting the
methods of "fluid recovery" used under the parens patraie statute,
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16760 (West 1964) and the Cartwright Act,
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (West 1964).

The court set out the three steps necessary to implement a "fluid
recovery." First, the defendant's total damages must be paid over to
a class fund. Second, under a lower standard of proof, members of
the class must be allowed the opportunity to claim their individual
share of the fund. Finally, the remaining unclaimed share of the
fund is to be distributed by one of the several procedures developed
by the court. These procedures include a price rollback, escheat, a
consumer trust fund, and claimant fund sharing. Each of these fluid
recovery methods and their strengths and weaknesses were discussed. Four factors were designated as criteria by which to determine the most appropriate method of fluid recovery: 1) amount of
compensation, 2) the proportion of sharing class members, 3) the benefits to nonclass members, and 4) the costs of administration.
Under a price rollback, the uncollected portion of a class recovery
is distributed to the class "through the market by lowering the price
of the defendant's product for a specified period" of time. Levi
Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d at 473, 715 P.2d at 571, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 612
(footnote omitted). This method is useful where the action involves
the purchase of "repeat items" that are bought regularly. Escheat allows the funds to be disbursed to a governmental organization to use
on projects that will benefit the overall class. This method is called
"earmarked escheat," and benefits the silent portion of the class. Escheat also includes payment of the residue to a general fund to be

used by a general governmental body. This is referred to as "general
escheat" and is used as a last resort where a more appropriate
method cannot be utilized. Under "claimant fund sharing," the residue of the fund is divided among each of the individual claimants.
Claimant fund sharing is used when a large portion of the class has
responded to the initial opportunity to claim class funds. The consumer "trust fund" uses the residue of the recovery to indirectly benefit the consumers and to give full effect to the underlying
substantive law. However, the consumer trust fund requires the
state to set up an individual organization to administer the fund. The
fund is segregated from the general budget, and it has its own administrative expenses.
The supreme court proposed guidelines for the lower courts to use
in class actions where "fluid recovery" is necessary to distribute the
residue in class recoveries. Trial courts generally have the ability to
use any of the methods of "fluid recovery." The decision in Vasquez
v. Superior Court,4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971)
should give some guidance, along with the present decision, to allow
the lower courts to develop practical legal devices to "simplify complex litigation" and to protect the interests and rights of all the parties involved. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d at 471, 715 P.2d at 570,
224 Cal. Rptr. at 611 (quoting Vasquez, 4 Cal. 3d at 820, 484 P.2d at
977, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 809). See also United States v. Exxon Corp., 773
F.2d 1240 (1985) (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.) (Department of Energy's antitrust action against Exxon for overcharging customers in violation
of oil price regulations); Alexander v. National Farmers' Organization, 614 F. Supp. 745 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (class action brought by farmers' organization to recover damages for dairy cooperatives' alleged
antitrust violations); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. N.Y. 1984) (class action for the Vietnam
veterans who were exposed to herbicides used in the war in Southeast Asia in which the proposed settlement was approved by the
court). For an overview of the use of fluid recovery in federal actions, see H. Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58
IND. L.J. 375, 405-09 (1983).
JOHN ERWIN TRYTEK
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II.

CRIMINAL LAW
The question of whether a promissory note is a security
within the meaning of the Corporations Code, for the
purposes of a criminal charge, is a questionfor the jury,
not the court, no matter how much evidence exists, and
the defendant's burden of proving an exemption to
securities regulations is to raise a reasonable doubt that
the security is not required to be registered: People v.
Figueroa.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Figueroa,' the supreme court held that it was reversible error for the trial judge to fail to specify the magnitude of the
defendants' burden of proving an exemption from the securities regulations and for the trial judge to inform the jury that the promissory
note in question was a security within the meaning of the securities
law. In addition, the defendants should have been allowed to present
evidence of the noteholder's participation in the business, as part of
their defense that the note was not required to be registered as a
security.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Joseph Figueroa and his son, Dennis, owned three businesses,
Figueroa Insulation & Energy Co., Inc. [hereinafter Figueroa Insulation], Figueroa Financial Insurance Services, Inc. [hereinafter Figueroa Insurance] and Figueroa Business & Financial Consultants
[hereinafter Figueroa Consultants]. In March of 1979, they sought to
raise capital for their existing businesses and for a new solar energy
business. They advertised for a partner, inactive or active, who could
contribute $7,000 or more. Arlo Kurrle responded to the advertisement and subsequently agreed to lend the company $10,000. In addition, he agreed to be an active partner in the business. 2 The loan was
paid in five installments, each loan being evidenced by a two year
note payable at ten percent interest. The fourth note was the basis of
the conviction of the Figueroas. The note, dated April 27, 1979, was
entitled a "Corporation Promissaroy [sic] Note," and was signed by
1. 41 Cal. 3d 714, 715 P.2d 680, 224 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1986). Chief Justice Bird wrote
the majority opinion, with which Justices Mosk, Broussard, Grodin, and Takei (Taketsugu) concurred. Justice Reynoso wrote a separate concurring opinion in which Justice Lucas concurred.
2. Id. at 718, 715 P.2d at 682, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 722.

Dennis on behalf of Figueroa Insulation. 3
Kurrle began working for the businesses in early April 1979 and
worked with the companies for about four months. Along with being
made secretary/treasurer of Figueroa Insurance and Figueroa Insulation, his responsibilities included updating loan source lists, contacting potential lenders, accompanying Dennis on sales calls, and
developing a sales kit for use in sales presentations. The court implied that Kurrle was never repaid for the loans.4 The Figueroas
were convicted of one count of selling unqualified securities in violation of section 25110 of the California Corporations Code.5
III.

ANALYSIS

A. The trial court'sfailure to specify appellants' burden of proof
was reversible error.
The first issue discussed by the court was the trial court's failure to
inform the jury of the Figueroas' burden of proving that their conduct came under an exemption to the securities regulations. 6 The
court adopted the court of appeal's analysis on this issue, 7 noting that
the issue of the precise burden of proving an exemption to securities
s
regulations was an issue of first impression in California.
In criminal cases, the general rule is that if the defendant is asserting an affirmative defense, the burden is only to raise a reasonable
doubt, and if he is asserting a collateral issue, the burden is to prove
it by a preponderance of the evidence. 9 Here, the appellants' defense
was affirmative, and the trial court's failure to inform the jury that
the defendants needed only to raise a reasonable doubt that they
were not required to register the notes was reversible error.'0
3. Id. at 719, 715 P.2d at 683, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 718, 715 P.2d at 682, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 721. Section 25110 of the Corporations Code states that "[i]t
is unlawful for any person to offer or sell in this state any
security in an issuer transaction ...unless such sale has been qualified under sections
25111, 25112 or 25113 .. . or unless such security or transaction is exempted under
Chapter 1 (commencing with section 25100) of this part." CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110
(West 1977).
6. The Figueroas raised a defense that they had made a private offering exempted from the requirements of section 25110 by section 25102(e) of the Corporations
Code. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25102(e), 25110 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986).
7. 41 Cal. 3d at 720, 715 P.2d at 683, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
8. Id. at 721, 715 P.2d at 684, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
9. See People v. Tewksbury, 15 Cal. 3d 953, 963-64, 544 P.2d 1335, 1343-44, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 135, 143-44 (1976); 2 B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK § 45.1, at
1640 (2d ed. 1982).
10. 41 Cal. 3d at 722-23, 715 P.2d at 685, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
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B. The trial court's errorin instructing the jury that the notes
were securities was reversible error.
The second issue raised by the appellants, and the principal question in the case, was whether the trial court erred in informing the
jury that the notes involved were securities within the meaning of
the corporate securities law." The court cited an abundance of authority for the rule that in a criminal case, the trial judge may not
direct a verdict or take an issue from the jury regardless of the
strength of the evidence.12 The court had previously interpreted a
United States Supreme Court case 13 as supporting the proposition
that such an error is reversible, because withdrawing an issue from
the jury would be a violation of due process and the right to a jury
trial.X4
The court discussed extensively United States v. Johnson,15 a fifth
circuit case which held that it was error to withhold from the jury
the question of whether a document was a security when that fact
was an element of the crime alleged.16 The court then rejected the
Attorney General's argument that that rule did not apply when
either (1) there was little doubt as to whether the element had been
established or (2) the question at issue was one of law properly decided by the judge.17
The first argument was rejected because the right to a jury trial
guarantees that all factual issues, not only the complex ones, must be
decided by the jury.' 8 The second argument was criticized because
the question of whether a document fits the legal definition of a security is a mixed question of law and fact properly decided by the
jury. It is the judge's duty to instruct the jury as to the definition of
a security (the question of law), but it is for the jury to decide
whether the document in question fits that definition (the mixed
question of law and fact). 19
11. Id. at 723, 715 P.2d at 685, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
12. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983); United States v. Martin
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330
U.S. 395 (1947).
13. Conneticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73.
14. People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d 539, 551, 684 P.2d 826, 832, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265, 271
(1984).
15. 718 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
16. 41 Cal. 3d at 729, 715 P.2d at 689, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
17. Id. at 730, 715 P.2d at 691, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
18. Id.
19. Id.

The court then criticized a line of appellate court cases which held
that the question of whether a document met the definition of a security was a question of law.20 The original case in this line, People v.
McCalla,21 presented the rule without citing any authority or analyzing how the rule affected the rights of due process and of trial by
jury.22 Subsequent cases did not discuss those issues either, but simply accepted the rule as presented in McCalla. This entire line of
cases is in conflict with United States v. Johnson,23 and with the established rule prohibiting directed verdicts in criminal trials.24
Therefore, those cases did not justify the trial court's instructions,
and the error required reversal.25
C. Appellants' evidence that the noteholder participatedin the
business was relevant to their defense, and this evidence should
be admitted on retrial.
The appellants' defense was that the notes issued to Kurrle were
not securities and did not need to be registered. The trial court concluded that they were securities, basing its decision on section 25019
of the Corporations Code.26 According to current case law, however,
substance governs over form 27 in determining whether an instrument

meets the statutory definition. "[T]he 'critical question' the courts
have sought to resolve in these cases is whether a transaction falls
within the regulatory purpose of the law regardless of whether it involves an instrument which comes within the literal language of the
definition."28

In determining whether an instrument comes within the statutory
definition of a security, this state has used the "risk capital" test, first
articulated in Silver Hills Country C7ub v. Sobieski.29 Under this
20. See People v. Skelton, 109 Cal. App. 3d 691, 167 Cal. Rptr. 636 (1980); People v.
Marvin, 48 Cal. App. 2d 180, 119 P.2d 413 (1941); People v. Dutton, 41 Cal. App. 2d 866,
107 P.2d 937 (1940); People v. McCalla, 63 Cal. App. 783, 220 P. 436 (1923).
21. 63 Cal. App. 783, 220 P. 436.
22. Id. at 789, 220 P. at 439.
23. 718 F.2d 1317.
24. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
25. 41 Cal. 3d at 733-34, 715 P.2d at 693-94, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 732-33.
26. Section 25019 lists examples of instruments, including notes and evidences of
indebtedness, that qualify as securities. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West 1977 & Supp.
1986).
27. 41 Cal. 3d at 734, 715 P.2d at 694, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 733; See Leyva v. Superior
Court, 164 Cal. App. 3d 462, 210 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1985); People v. Shock, 152 Cal. App. 3d
379, 199 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1984).
28. 41 Ca]. 3d at 735, 715 P.2d at 694, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
29. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). The "risk capital" approach has been adopted by the ninth circuit to decide whether a promissory note fits
the definition of a security under federal securities laws. See El Khadem v. Equity Sec.
Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974). The federal court's
interpretation of the test focuses on whether the investor "contributed 'risk capital'
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test, the appropriate factors to consider include the adequacy of collateral given for the investment and the degree of the investor's participation in the business.3 0 In applying these facts to the present
case, it was apparent that Kurrle did not receive any collateral for his
investment; in addition, he may have contributed sufficient services
to the businesses to exert control and eliminate the "risk" element of
the transaction. 31 The latter was an issue which should have been
determined by the jury. 32 Therefore, the trial judge erred in refusing
to admit evidence of Kurrle's participation. For this reason, the judgment of the court of appeal was reversed. 33 "On retrial, the trial
court should permit evidence of Kurrle's participation in appellants'
34
businesses."
IV.

THE CONCURRING OPINION

Justice Reynoso agreed that in this case, the question of whether
the notes were securities was a jury question and that it was reversible error to exclude evidence of Kurrle's participation in the businesses.3 5 However, he did not agree with the court's decision to
formulate an absolute rule which requires the jury to decide every issue of fact, no matter how convincing the evidence.3 6 On the facts
presented, he did not feel that such a rule was necessary to decide
37
the case.
V.

CONCLUSION

A criminal case requires that the jury, not the court, decide the issubject to the 'entrepreneurial or managerial efforts' of [others]." Great W. Bank &
Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981). The
Supreme Court has reserved judgment on whether to adopt the risk capital test.
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 857 n.24, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884
(1975). See also Annotation: "Risk Capital" Test For Determination of Whether
TransactionInvolves a Security, Within Meaning of FederalSecurities Act of 1933 (15
USCS §§ 77a et seq.) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.), 68
A.L.R. FED. 89 (1984); Annotation: Promissory Notes as Securities Under § 2(1) of Securities Act of 1933 (15 USCS § 77b(1)), and § 3(a)(10) of Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 USCS § 78c(a)(10)), 39 A.L.R. FED. 357 (1978).
30. Silver Hills, 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188; People v.
Schock, 152 Cal. App. 3d 379, 386, 199 Cal. Rptr. 327, 330 (1984).
31. 41 Cal. 3d at 738-39, 715 P.2d at 696-97, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 735-36.
32. Id. at 740, 715 P.2d at 698, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 736-37.
33. Id. at 741, 715 P.2d at 699, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
34. Id.
35. Id. (Reynoso, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 741-42, 715 P.2d at 699, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 738 (Reynoso, J., concurring).
37. Id. (Reynoso, J., concurring).

sue of whether or not a document is a security within the meaning of
the Corporations Code, no matter how much evidence exists. This
case provides that a criminal defendant, charged with violating the
securities regulations, need only raise a reasonable doubt that the security was not required to be registered in proving an exemption.
EILEEN M. LAVIGNE

III.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Mandatory imposition offull, separate and consecutive
prison terms pursuant to section 6676(d) of the
CaliforniaPenal Code for perpetrationof sex offenses
against the same victim on "separateoccasions" requires
a finding that the perpetratortemporarily lost or
abandoned the opportunity to continue his attack: People

v. Craft.
People v. Craft, 41 Cal. 3d 554, 715 P.2d 585, 224 Cal. Rptr. 626
(1986), represented defendant's appeal from a conviction for multiple
counts of rape which resulted in consecutive sentencing. See also Annotation, Multiple Instances of ForceableIntercourse Involving Same
Defendant and Same Victim as Constituting Multiple Crimes of
Rape, 81 A.L.R. 3d 1228 (1977); 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 304 (1957).
The trial court failed to cite the relevant statutory section that it
used to sentence the defendant, and failed to indicate the reasons for
imposing consecutive sentences. Craft contended that the trial court
erred by doing either of the following: (1) sentencing under section
667.6(c) of the California Penal Code and failing to enunciate reasons
as required; or (2) sentencing pursuant to section 667.6(d) of the California Penal Code, incorrectly finding that the offenses had occurred
on "separate occasions." CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(c), (d) (West
Supp. 1986).
Section 667.6(c) of the California Penal Code substantively allows
for the discretionary imposition of full, separate and consecutive
terms, whether or not the crimes were committed during a "single
transaction." Case law dictates that the courts must articulate their
reasons for the imposition of these sentences and for the failure to
utilize sentencing pursuant to section 1170.1(a) of the California Penal Code. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 155 Cal. App. 3d 539, 202 Cal.
Rptr. 259 (1984). Section 667.6(d) of the California Penal Code, however, mandates that consecutive sentencing occur if such crimes involve "separate victims or involve the same victim on separate
occasions." See People v. Fleming, 140 Cal. App. 3d 540, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 619 (1983).
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In Craft, the court interpreted and identified the standard for de-

termining if the offenses occurred on "separate occasions." Statutory
construction entails an evaluation of several factors: (1) the language
itself, (2) the overall statutory scheme, (3) avoidance of a construction that negates the force of another statutory component, and (4) a
construction allowing the benefit of the doubt to the defendant. The
court found that the language of subdivision (d) was ambiguous, and
required construction in light of the statute as a whole. Section 667.6,

subdivisions (a) and (b), of the California Penal Code, apply to repeat
offenders, while subdivisions (c) and (d) apply to multiple offenses.
Subdivision (c) allows the discretionary imposition of consecutive
sentences, while (d) mandates their imposition. Inferentially, the
legislative purpose of subdivisions (c) and (d) must be to address differing classes of offenders, one more culpable than the other, thus
identifying the need for harsher punishment in the one instance.
Having identified the legislative purpose, the court found that a
narrow construction of the term "separate occasions" was neccessary
to effectuate that purpose. They held that subdivision (d) applied
only to offenses against the same victim between which the perpetrator had lost or abandoned the opportunity to continue his attack. It
did not simply denote distinct moments in time; rather, loss of the
opportunity to continue is exemplified by the victim becoming free of
the criminal activity. Abandonment is signified by the actions of the
perpetrator, specifically, his engaging in a "significant activity" unrelated to the attack even if the victim remains under his control.
The court offered several rationales for this construction. The requirement in subsection (d) of mandatory imposition of the consecutive term, alluded to the extended culpability of this offender. If
''separate occasions" denotes an attacker who discontinues the act,
and allowing time for reflection, subsequently instigates another offense, this individual arguably deserves harsher punishment than one
who perpetrates several offenses in one "uninterrupted sequence of
events." Narrow construction is also consistent with subdivision (d)'s
applicability to offenses against "separate victims," both inferring discontinuation and reaffirmation of the activity. Further, any broader
construction negates the force and effect of subdivision (c). Virtually
all offenses would fall within subdivision (d)'s term "separate occasion" if it merely denoted distinct points in time. The court found
that an interpretation giving "guided discretion to the trial judge"
was preferred.
In applying this standard to the facts of the case, the court found

that the defendant's activities did not occur on "separate occasions."
Thus, if the sentencing were pursuant to subdivision (d), it was in error. Sentencing, pursuant to subdivision (c), was also erroneous because no statement of reasons was given. The court remanded the
case for resentencing only. The court gave this holding full retroactive effect, noting that defendants who should have been sentenced
under subdivision (c), but were erroneously sentenced pursuant to
subdivision (d), may now seek relief by petition for habeas corpus.
In guiding trial courts to more effective sentencing, the court suggested that sentencing under subdivision (d) should be accompanied
by reasons for the imposition of the sentence, and should state the
sentence that would have been imposed if subdivision (d) did not apply. This suggestion was made to prevent "fruitless appeals" where
lower courts erred in choosing between subdivisions (c) and (d).
The differentiation utilized by the court is not free of difficulties in
terms of application. Ascertaining what "significant activity" unrelated to the act consists of, or when the victim becomes "free of the
criminal activity," may require further guidance from the court. For
further discussion of this topic, see 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law
§ 606 (1981); 17 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw § 269 (1984); CAL. DIG. OF
OFFICIAL REPORTS 3D Rape § 16 (1984); CAL. DIG. OF OFFICIAL RE-

PORTS 3D Criminal Law § 526 (1985).
PAMELA JOAN MINETTO

B.

When sentencing convicted criminals, the double-base
term rule does not apply if any of the specified
enhancements listed as exceptions in section 1170.1(g)
of the CaliforniaPenal Code are imposed: People v.
Magill.

The double-base term rule is a statutory limitation on the prison
term which is imposed for multiple crimes. People v. Wright, 92 Cal.
App. 3d 811, 813, 154 Cal. Rptr. 926, 927 (1979). Section 1170.1(g) of
the California Penal Code provides in part: "The term of imprisonment shall not exceed twice the number of years imposed by the trial
court as the base term. . . ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(g) (West
Supp. 1986). The defendant in People v. Magill, 41 Cal. 3d 777, 715
P.2d 662, 224 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1986), was sentenced to a prison term of
five years and eight months for conviction of four counts of embezzlement and one count of false pretenses. The defendant's base term
was two years determined by count one. A one year enhancement
was added pursuant to section 12022.6(a) of the California Penal Code
(commission of an excessive taking during a felony). CAL. PENAL
CODE § 12022.6(a)(West 1982). The remaining four counts subjected
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the defendant to an additional prison term of two years and eight
months, for a total sentence of five years and eight months. The defendant appealed the lower court's decision, arguing that her total
prison term should have been restricted to five years premised on the
double-base term rule.
Section 1170.1(g) of the California Penal Code establishes four statutory exceptions to the double-base sentence limitation. These exceptions are as follows: (1) a conviction of a violent felony, (2) a
serious prison offense, (3) an imposition of a special enhancement
and (4) a conviction of a felonious prison escape. This case dealt primarily with the enhancement exception. Because the language of the
statute is nebulous, the statute has been subject to conflicting interpretations. Two specific explanations have been offered.
One interpretation, which was the defendant's contention, was that
the prison term was limited to twice the base term plus the enhancement. This view was substantiated in People v. Sequeira, 126 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 20-21, 179 Cal. Rptr. 249, 260 (1981), where the court distinguished between enhancements and the remaining three exceptions
and concluded that the legislature could not possibly have intended
to be so severe with respect to enhancements. The second interpretation is that the exceptions are indistinguishable and that presence of
any of the exceptions makes the double-base term restriction inapplicable. This approach was followed in Wright, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 813,
154 Cal. Rptr. at 927, and affirmed by the court in this case.
Special enhancements are activated by (1) being armed with or using a firearm during a felony, (2) providing a firearm to a co-conspirator in the commission of a felony, (3) committing an excessive
taking during a felony, (4) inflicting great bodily injury during a felony or (5) intentionally causing the termination of a pregnancy during a felony. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12022, 12022.4, 12022.5, 12022.6,
12022.7, 12022.9 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986) (this list is not exhaustive).
To interpret the enhancement exception exclusive of the other three
exceptions would require a fine line judgment. The court in this case
found all four exceptions equally severe and held the double-base
term rule completely inoperative.
ARIAN COLACHIS

C.

W7hen extradition is sought, the asylum state may
inquire into the guilt or innocence of the extraditee
who asserts that no crime was committed under the
laws of the demanding state: People v. Superior Court
(Smolin).

In People v. Superior Court (Smolin), 41 Cal. 3d 758, 716 P.2d 991,
225 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1986), the Governor of Louisiana requested the extradition of Richard Smolin and his father for the alleged kidnapping
of Smolin's two young children from a bus stop in Louisiana. The defendants filed a writ of habeas corpus to resist extradition, admitting
that while they had committed the acts for which they were charged,
those acts did not constitute a crime in the demanding state. The
trial court issued a writ discharging the defendants after taking judicial notice of a California custody decree granting sole custody of the
children to the father. The supreme court affirmed.
The extradition clause of the United States Constitution provides
for the "absolute right" to obtain extradition of one charged with a
crime to the state having jurisdiction over the crime. U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 2, cl. 2. This right confers on a court in the asylum state a "correlative obligation to deliver, without reference to the character of
the crime charged, or to the policy or laws of the State to which the
fugitive has fled." Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 103 (1861). The
California Supreme Court in In re Kimler, 37 Cal. 2d 568, 233 P.2d
902 (1951), prohibited the asylum state's inquiry "into the guilt or innocence of the person sought by the demanding state." Id. at 571, 233
P.2d at 904. In considering a habeas corpus request after extradition
has been granted, a court can only inquire into the following:
whether the documents were facially proper; whether the petitioner,
who had been charged with the crime in the demanding state, was
the same person named in the extradition request; and whether the
defendant was a fugitive. See Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289
(1982).
The supreme court was able to circumvent this limitation on the
scope of inquiry based on section 1548.2 of the California Penal Code
(adopted from the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act). This section
requires that a demand for extradition be accompanied by an indictment which "substantially charges" a crime under the demanding
state's laws. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1548.2 (West 1982). The defendants
claimed that they had not been substantially charged with a crime
under the laws of Louisiana, and therefore, they were entitled to discharge. The court was required to analyze the Louisiana kidnapping
statute to arrive at a determination of whether the petitioner had
been charged with a crime in the demanding state. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:45 (West 1986).
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The Louisiana statute defines kidnapping as taking a child "from
the custody of any person to whom custody has been awarded by any
court of competent jurisdiction of any state." Id. The court determined that at the time of the alleged kidnapping, Richard Smolin
was entitled to legal custody of the children based on a California
custody decree of February 27, 1981, which granted him sole custody;
this decree was binding on Louisiana under the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1980. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West Supp. 1986).
Since Richard had sole custody of the children pursuant to federal
and Louisiana law, he could not be guilty of the crime of kidnapping
as defined by Louisiana law.
For additional materials on this topic see 20 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal
Law § 2416, at 248 (1985) (discussing scope of inquiry); 6 B. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent Child §§ 53-54 (8th ed. 1974)
(on procedure for extradition); and Note, Sufficiency of Information
as Basis for Extradition, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 216 (1954).
GORDON W. JOHNSON

D. Admissions of prior convictions will result in
statutory enhancement of the sentence, and the
admissions need not be part of a plea bargain in
order to be effective: People v. Thomas.
In People v. Thomas, 41 Cal. 3d 837, 718 P.2d 94, 226 Cal. Rptr. 107
(1986), the supreme court held that for the purpose of the five year
statutory enhancement for each prior conviction of a serious felony
under section 667 of the California Penal Code, an admission of a
prior conviction of burglary, without specific reference to the residential character of the crime, was sufficient to be a "serious felony"
under section 1192.7 of the California Penal Code. The court pointed
out that the issue was not whether the defendant entered a residence, but whether the burglary was committed in such an offensive
manner as to render it a serious felony under section 1192.7(c)(8) of
the California Penal Code. The court also held that the admissions of
prior convictions were effective, regardless of whether they were a
part of a plea bargain, provided that certain requirements were satisfied. In essence, the issue of adequate consideration was held to be
an irrelevant factor in determining the effectiveness of the
admission.
Prior to trial, the defendant, who was charged with rape, admitted
to four prior convictions of burglary without specifically admitting to

the entrance of the residences. The admissions were made to prevent
the court from submitting the question of the validity of the prior
convictions before the jury. The jury found the defendant guilty of
rape. Consequently, the defendant was sentenced to twenty-eight
years in prison: eight years for the rape, and pursuant to section
667(a) of the California Penal Code, five years for each prior conviction, resulting in a statutory enhancement of twenty years. The
court carefully pointed out that such harsh exercise of statutory enhancement was due to the state's desire to limit the defendant's contact with the public because of his dangerous schizophrenic mental
disorder.
On appeal, the defendant raised two contentions. First, he argued
that the admissions were ineffective for the purpose of the statutory
enhancement. The defendant unsuccessfully argued that under section 1192.7(c)(8) of the California Penal Code, the burglary must be
"of a residence" to be a serious felony. The defendant, therefore, asserted that without the admission of entrance into a residence, his
prior burglaries could not be a serious felony under the Penal Code.
The court rejected this argument by holding that a burglary need
not involve a residence to be a serious felony. Under section
1192.7(c)(8) of the California Penal Code, a serious felony is defined
as any felony "in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on
any person, other than an accomplice. . . ." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1192.7(c)(8) (West 1982). The court acknowledged the existence of
a defect in the pleading as it failed to specify the nature of the burglaries committed by the defendant. Nonetheless, the court declined
to reverse the trial court's holding. Ruling on a procedural question,
the court held that the defendant must demur in order to raise a deficiency in the pleading. Failure to enter a demurrer is deemed as a
waiver. Thus, since the defendant failed to demur, the court held it
to be a waiver. Interestingly, the court's suggested remedy for a possible injustice caused by the rule (for example, when counsel fails to
explain the essentials of the charge to the defendant) was to petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.
The defendant also contended that his admissions were ineffective
for want of adequate consideration as they were not a part of plea
bargaining. The court also rejected this argument by holding that the
only relevant issue was whether the defendant's admissions were
made voluntarily and with knowledge of his constitutional rights and
the consequences. Provided these requirements were satisfied, an admission was held to be effective regardless of whether adequate consideration had been given.
In conclusion, this case shows the court's willingness to broaden
the definition of a serious felony under section 1192.7 of the Califor-
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nia Penal Code. Since section 1192.7(c)(18) specifically lists "burglary
of a residence," one could interpret this as limiting the definition of a
"serious felony" in burglary-related crimes. The court, however, interpreted this subdivision as an example of a broader definition
stated in section 1192.7(c)(8) of the California Penal Code. Another
interesting aspect of this case was the court's suggested remedy as a
result of its rigid procedural rule. Considering that the court is
known for its willingness to provide greater protection for criminal
rights than federal courts, the suggested remedy through habeas
corpus appears to be a deviation from the norm.
SUNG-Do GONG

Iv. DEATH PENALTY
A. A parole agent must be in possession offacts which infer
a reasonablesuspicion that a parolee has violated or is
planning to violate his parole, in order to authorize a
search of his residence. Claims of jury misconduct must
be brought in a petitionfor habeas corpus, and reversal
of a capital case is mandated when an attorney fails to
put forth mitigating evidence during a trial'spenalty
phase at the instruction of his client: People v. Burgener.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Burgener,l the defendant, Michael Burgener, had been
convicted of the murder of a sales clerk in a 7-Eleven convenience
store.2 In finding that the murder was of the first degree committed
during the commission of a robbery, the jury imposed the death sen4
tence. 3 The instant appeal was automatic.
II.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

On October 31, 1980, the sales clerk in a Riverside 7-Eleven con1. 41 Cal. 3d 505, 714 P.2d 1251, 224 Cal. Rptr. 112 (1986). The majority opinion
was written by Justice Grodin, with Justices Reynoso and Wallin concurring. Separate
concurring opinions were authored by Justices Mosk and Broussard. Chief Justice
Bird wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
2. Burgener was found guilty of murder and robbery with the use of a firearm,
infliction of great bodily injury, and possession of a firearm while on probation. Id. at
511, 714 P.2d at 1254, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
3. California's death penalty is set forth in section 190.2 of the California Penal
Code. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West Supp. 1986).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239 (West Supp. 1986).

venience store was shot during a robbery attempt and eventually
died. During trial, testimony indicated that shortly after the shooting, Burgener was at an apartment which he shared with his girlfriend.5 Later that morning, his girlfriend arranged to exchange a
gun owned by her with the man who had originally sold it to her, explaining that the gun had been used to kill someone during the commission of a crime. The man telephoned the police and, with their
knowledge, arranged to meet the defendant and his girlfriend to "exchange guns" later that day. It was at this exchange that Burgener
was arrested while in possession of a gun which could have been used
in the shooting, 6 wearing shoes which tested positive for the presence
of blood, and carrying $72.7 With the permission of Burgener's parole
officer, the police initiated a search of the apartment and found a paper bag from a 7-Eleven store with two $5 bills inside.
III.

A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Guilt Phase Issues
1.

Motion for Co-counsel

The defendant contended that the trial court erred in refusing his
motion to appoint co-counsel in that it was a denial of effective assistance of counsel. The motion was based upon the premise that since
two attorneys were statutorily permitted, it was a denial of equal pro8
tection not to appoint such.
The supreme court held that it was within the trial court's discretion to determine the need to appoint co-counsel. Thus, the supreme
court reaffirmed the rule which it laid down in People v. Jackson 9
and Keenan v. Superior Court.1o Although defendant's counsel had
5. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 513, 714 P.2d at 1255, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 117. This testimony was given by Burgener's girlfriend who, in addition, testified that she thought he

had mentioned "shooting someone in self defense," "a robbery," and "one of those little stores." Id. The testimony of the defendant himself at trial contradicted this evidence; however, such was in direct conflict with similarly differing statements which
he made to his parole officer and the police prior to the trial. Id. at 515-16, 714 P.2d at
1256-57, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 118.

6. Ballistics tests upon the gun in the possession of Burgener and ammunition
found in a community area of the girlfriend's apartment house were inconclusive. The

tests merely showed that fragments of such ammunition found in the body of the clerk
could have come from the gun and could have come from the same melt of lead. Id. at
515, 714 P.2d at 1256, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 118.

7. Id. at 514, 714 P.2d at 1256, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1095 (West 1985).
9. 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980) (holding that determination of need for court appointed co-counsel is at the discretion of the trial court and
defense counsel must put forth facts which indicate a need for additional counsel).
10. 31 Cal. 3d 424, 640 P.2d 108, 180 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1982) (holding that determination of need for court appointed co-counsel is at the discretion of the trial court and
must be based upon a "genuine need").
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to file a "couple of writs," the court found that this was insufficient
to satisfy the factual assertion of genuine need required by Jackson
and Keenan." Therefore, there was no reversible error.
2.

Cross-examination

The defendant further contended that the trial court erred in disallowing cross-examination for impeachment purposes of his girlfriend
regarding her possible prior criminal associations with the man from
whom she had bought the gun at issue in the present case. 12 The
court noted that such evidence is generally admissible. However, the
court ruled that given the totality of the damaging evidence with respect to the girlfriend's credibility,13 the trial court was within its discretion to disallow its admittance on the grounds that such additional
evidence would waste the court's time while merely having a cumulative effect.14
3.

Admission of Blood Tests on Defendant's Shoes

The defendant next argued that the trial court erred in allowing
evidence relating to a blood screening test run on his shoes. The
tests were positive, indicating the presence of blood; however, the
tests were susceptible to error and could have produced such a positive reaction even if no blood were in fact present.
Although the tests were inconclusive as to the exact nature of the
substance found on the shoes or the length of time such had been
there, the supreme court held that this was not grounds for precluding admission of that evidence.15 Rather, the court reasoned that the
fact that a test is not absolutely certain is simply a factor to take into
11. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 522-24, 714 P.2d at 1261-63, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 123-24.
12. Section 780(f) of the California Evidence Code provides that evidence which
tends to prove the existence of a bias on the part of a witness is admissible for impeachment purposes. CAL. EVID. CODE § 780(f) (West 1966).
13. The girlfriend testified that she was a heroin addict and was undergoing methadone treatment. In addition, she testified that she had taken valium the night before
and the day of the crime. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 525, 714 P.2d at 1263, 224 Cal. Rptr.
at 125.
14. Id. at 526, 714 P.2d at 1264, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 125. Section 352 of the California
Evidence Code provides that a court may exclude evidence when such will have no
more than a cumulative effect. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
15. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 526-27, 714 P.2d at 1264-65, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26.
The court specifically rejected the court of appeal's reasoning in People v. Sloan, 76
Cal. App. 3d 611, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1978) (testimony upon such tests is irrelevant due
to its inherent uncertainty and is inadmissible under section 210 of the California Evidence Code).

account. The court relied on section 210 of the Evidence Code' 6
which bars as irrelevant only evidence which has no tendency to
prove guilt or innocence. 17 However, section 352 of the Evidence
Code became applicable as the court, in its discretion, had to determine if the substance of the evidence was outweighed by its potential
for prejudice.1S As the trial court failed to make such a determination with any degree of specificity, the supreme court had to determine whether the outcome was, in fact, a miscarriage of justice
requiring reversal.19 The court held that the remaining evidence,
which was properly admitted, left no reasonable probability that the
judgment would have been different without the error. 20 Therefore,
the lower court's decision was not reversible upon this ground.
4.

Warrantless Search of Apartment

The defendant also argued that the search of his shared apartment
was unlawful; therefore, the two $5 bills and the brown 7-Eleven bag
should have been excluded. The defendant contended that the rationale behind allowing warrantless intrusions when there was a
signed probationary agreement allowing such was not applicable in
the present case. While most probation agreements are voluntarily
acceded to by the parolee, the defendant's probation2l was mandated
by law; therefore, he argued that the rationale did not apply. 22
The court noted that a parolee does have a greater degree of protection 23 from such warrantless intrusions than he did while in
16. Section 210 provides in pertinent part that "'Relevant evidence' means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness . . . having any tendency ... to prove or disprove any disputed fact.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West
1966) (emphasis added).
17. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 527, 714 P.2d at 1264-65, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
18. Id. at 527, 714 P.2d at 1265, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 126 (citing People v. Green, 27 Cal.
3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980), for the proposition that section 352 of the
Evidence Code requires the trial court to determine whether the substance of the evidence at issue is outweighed by the increase in potential for prejudice, and if no such
determination is made, it represents reversible error to the extent that it resulted in a
miscarriage of justice).
19. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13.
20. Burgener,41 Cal. 3d at 528, 714 P.2d at 1265, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
21. The defendant had signed a standard parole agreement upon release from
prison providing for allowance of warrantless searches by law enforcement officials.
Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 529 n.10, 714 P.2d at 1266 n.10, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 127 n.10.
22. Id. at 529, 714 P.2d at 1266, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28. See People v. Mason, 5 Cal.
3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971) (parole search upheld on grounds that
probationer freely accepted written conditions of parole in exchange for government's
granting of such, including warrantless searches, and that such agreement is binding).
The defendant argued that the court's decision in Mason should be distinguished on
the grounds that in the instant case the parole was mandatory; therefore, the defendant could not "freely" agree to the limitations imposed upon his freedom. Burgener,41
Cal. 3d at 529, 714 P.2d at 1266, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
23. The court specifically noted that while the argument in the present case was
based entirely upon the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, section 13 of
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prison. 24 However, the court refused to extend this greater protection to the extent of that enjoyed by citizens not on parole. Rather,
the court mandated that a balancing of society's interest against that
of the parolee is required to determine the extent to which a parolee's rights under the constitution may be curtailed. 25 By balancing
the parolee's privacy and liberty interests against the interests of society, namely that of public safety in the avoidance of future criminality, the court found that such warrantless intrusions are not per
se unreasonable if related to parole supervision in some manner. 26
To be related to parole supervision, the court found that a search
"must be based on information which leads the parole agent who conducts or authorizes the search to believe that the parolee has violated
the law or another condition of his parole, or is planning to do so.''27
The supreme court analogized the situation faced by a school administrator who must regulate and maintain order over the actions of
pupils with that of a parole agent who must regulate and maintain
order over the actions of assigned parolees. Thus, the court was able
to apply the reasonablesuspicion standard of review which had been
recently set forth in In re William G.28 The court reasoned that the
information received by Burgener's parole agent from the police was
adequate for the agent to infer a reasonable suspicion.2 9 The court
further ruled that the fact that the search was not conducted by the
parole agent or for the sole purpose of determining a parole violation
was inconsequential. 30 The court reasoned that any violation of the
law by parolees is a violation of their parole; thus, the ability to permit such a warrantless intrusion falls under the umbrella of the paArticle 1 of the California Constitution would afford greater protection against such
searches, but refused to make such a distinction in this particular instance. Burgener,
41 Cal. 3d at 529 n.11, 714 P.2d at 1266 n.11, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 127 n.11 (citing People v.
Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975)).
24. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 530, 714 P.2d at 1267, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
25. Id. at 531, 714 P.2d at 1267, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
26. Id. at 532-33, 714 P.2d at 1268-69, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31.
27. Id. at 533, 714 P.2d at 1269, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 130. It is interesting to note that

the court left open the door to allow for the possibility of justification of unannounced
or random searches by stating that the court has "no occasion to determine" such in
the present case. Id. at n.13, 714 P.2d at 1269 n.13, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 130 n.13.

28. 40 Cal. 3d 550, 709 P.2d 1287, 221 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1985) (holding that a school
administrator may make warrantless intrusions by searching students when there is
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity); see Note, CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey:
In re William G., 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1120 (1986).

29. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 536, 714 P.2d at 1271, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 132-33.
30. Id.

role officer's powers. 31

The extension of the reasonable suspicion standard to parolees
may indicate a recent willingness on the part of the supreme court to
limit the protection of certain constitutional rights when necessary to
protect the interests of society. However, it is still unclear as to
whether the court will extend this approach to other situations in
which an administerial role would be facilitated by such power.
5.

Jury Instructions

The defendant argued that the trial court gave incorrect jury instructions. This argument was based on the following two grounds:
First, since general verdicts are required in criminal cases, the instruction that a special finding of express malice be found was reversible error; second, the fact that the jury was not specifically
instructed that a finding of express malice had to be unanimous and
based upon the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was reversible
error.
With respect to the first of these arguments, the supreme court
reasoned that section 115032 of the Penal Code does not contradict

section 190.433 of the Penal Code. The court held that the terms
"special finding," used in section 190.4, and "special verdict," used in
section 1150, were not synonymous. Therefore, the trial court's instruction requesting such a special finding was not a violation of section 1150.34

With respect to the second argument, the supreme court applied
the well settled rule that the correctness of jury instructions is
viewed in light of the instructions as a whole, and not by way of a
piecemeal approach.3 5 Since the jury was instructed to use unanimous decisions with guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as criterion, the
court reasoned that the failure to specifically reinstruct the jury to do
so was not reversible error.36
31. The court specifically disapproved of the prior appellate decision in People v.
Coffman, 2 Cal. App. 3d 681, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969), to the extent that it is inconsistent with the present opinion. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 536 n.14, 714 P.2d at 1271 n.14,
224 Cal. Rptr. at 133 n.14.
32. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1150 (West 1985) (requiring that a jury render a general
verdict).
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4 (West Supp. 1986) (requiring a special jury finding as
to alleged special circumstances).
34. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 537-38, 714 P.2d at 1272, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34.
35. Id. at 538, 714 P.2d at 1273, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 134 (citing People v. Rhodes, 21
Cal. App. 3d 10, 98 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1971); People v. Salas, 51 Cal. App. 3d 151, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 903 (1975)).
36. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 539-40, 714 P.2d at 1273-74, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
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6.

Alleged Juror Misconduct

The defendant next contended that the trial court's failure to examine a juror during the trial whose integrity was brought into question violated the defendant's right to a jury trial. During
deliberations, the jury foreman informed the judge that one juror
was obviously intoxicated and that four jurors had expressed concern
about this to him. 37 During consultation with counsel, defendant's
counsel objected to either replacing the jurors with an alternate or
bringing the juror in for questioning by the judge. The objection was
based upon the defense counsel's belief that such a singling out of
that particular juror would "destroy the jury," and the possibility
that the accusation was false and intended to get the particular juror
off of the panel. Eventually, the trial court judge, with agreement of
the defense counsel, elected to admonish the entire jury against the
use of intoxicants and allow the jury panel to remain as it was. 38
The court distinguished People v. Lee Chuck 39 by noting that in
this case, unlike Lee Chuck, there was insufficient evidence to show
that the juror in question actually was under the influence of any intoxicant. 40 The court distinguished People v. McNeal 41 in that the
trial court in that case was under a statutorily prescribed duty to initiate a formal hearing unlike the situation presented by the present
case. 42 However, the court specifically determined that even absent
such a statutory necessity, an inquiry is required whenever the court
has notice that there may be good cause to remove a juror. 43 Therefore, the trial court's failure to perform any formal inquiry in the
44
present case was error.
The court, however, did not find that the trial judge's failure to in37. Id. at 517, 714 P.2d at 1257, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
38. Id.
39. 78 Cal. 317, 20 P. 719 (1889) (holding that proof of juror's usage of intoxicants
during a trial or deliberations requires reversal if not corrected at trial stage).
40. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 518, 714 P.2d at 1258, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 119-20.
41. 90 Cal. App. 3d 830, 153 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1979) (holding that a trial court must
determine if there is good cause for discharge of a juror, generally through examination, if the juror declares personal involvement with the case at issue).
42. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 519-20, 714 P.2d at 1259, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 120-21.
43. Id. at 519, 714 P.2d at 1259, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 120. The court reasoned that even
though the substitution of a juror was discretionary, the failure to conduct an investigation to determine the validity of allegations against a juror results in an abuse of discretion and is subject to appellate review. Id. at 519-20, 714 P.2d at 1259, 224 Cal. Rptr.
at 120-21.
44. Id. at 521, 714 P.2d at 1260, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 122.

vestigate constituted reversible error.45 Rather, the supreme court
held that there was a lack of evidence on appeal validating the
charges and that, unlike McNeal, this lack of evidence was due in total to the objections of the defense counsel.4 6 Therefore, there was
insufficient evidence to evaluate a claim of juror misconduct at the
7
appellate level, and the actions of the trial court were affirmed.4
The supreme court, analogizing the present situation to that in People v. Pope,48 ruled that claims of jury misconduct must be brought in
a petition for habeas corpus as such a forum allows for an evidentiary
hearing to avoid the "second guessing" of the circumstances sur49
rounding the issue.
B. Penalty Phase Issue
During the penalty phase of his trial, the defendant refused to allow his counsel to put forth any evidence which would tend to mitigate sentencing. The only evidence presented by the defendant
during the penalty phase of the trial was the reading by counsel of a
statement written by Burgener which, in effect, asked the jury to impose the death penalty upon him for what he had done.50 The
supreme court relied upon its decisions in People v. Deere51 and People v. Brown5 2 to overturn the jury's finding, and lower court order,
which had imposed the penalty of death.
The supreme court held that the failure of defense counsel to bring
forth mitigating evidence when such was available required reversal
under Deere.5 3 The court viewed the Deere decision as mandating reversal of any capital case upon "the failure of defense counsel to
present any mitigating evidence in the penalty phase.., in obedience
to his client's request. . ...54 This language, in effect, represents a
modification, rather than a following, of the Deere decision.
In Deere, unlike the present case, the court specifically noted that
the decision to exempt mitigating evidence during the penalty phase
45. Id.
46. Id. In the present case, only the foreman believed that the juror was intoxicated. An important factor in the supreme court's determination was the belief that

the defense counsel's objections were tactically motivated. Id.
47. Id. at 522, 714 P.2d at 1261, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
48. 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979). The court in Pope stated,
in pertinent part, that "where the record shows that counsel's omissions resulted from
an informed tactical choice within the range of reasonable competence, the conviction
must be affirmed." Id. at 425, 590 P.2d at 866, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
49. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 522, 714 P.2d at 1261, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23.
50. Id. at 540-41, 714 P.2d at 1274-75, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 136. The statement concluded with the following: "I [defendant] ask you to return a sentence of death." Id.
51. 41 Cal. 3d 353, 710 P.2d 925, 222 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1985).
52. 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985).
53. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 542, 714 P.2d at 1275, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
54. Id. at 541, 714 P.2d at 1275, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
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was due entirely to the desires of the defendant and had no basis in a
tactical decision by the attorney. 55 Justice Broussard, in his concurrence, stated that he was "confident that we [the court] would not reverse a penalty judgment after the trial court had taken independent
steps to assure a fair and balanced penalty trial, even though the mit6
igating evidence was not presented by defense counsel."5
Thus, in Deere the court had apparently limited the use of this rule
to those situations in which it was obvious that the decision not to
bring forth mitigating evidence was not a tactical one. In the present
case, the court followed no such limitation. The lack of this limitation further exposes a rule mandating introduction of mitigating evidence. This can probably be attacked on the grounds that it forces
legal aid upon an unwilling client, and forces a person to grovel for
mercy by playing upon the jury's emotions and perhaps lose every
shred of esteem left to him. In addition, it can be misused by counsel
for a tactical advantage: counsel can refuse to bring forth mitigating
evidence and then get the death penalty sentence reversed.57
The supreme court also applied the rule set forth in Brown. This
rule mandates that the jury in death penalty cases must be instructed
that they may take into account mitigating factors other than those
brought forth in the penalty phase of the trial. The court based this
decision upon the trial court's failure to specifically inform the jury
that it had the "sole discretion to determine the appropriate penalty
for defendant under all the relevant circumstances."58 The court felt
that such an instruction was necessary in view of the lack of mitigating evidence presented and the actual language of section 190.3 of the
Penal Code. The court failed to discuss, however, the impact that
this decision will have upon a jury's ability to effectively impose the
death penalty in deserving situations. What occurs when the defendant's counsel brings forth a single piece of mitigating evidence on
which the jury places little weight in an attempt to circumvent the
55. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 364 n.3, 710 P.2d at 931 n.3, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 20 n.3. In
addition, unlike the present case, defendant's counsel had argued in favor of offering
the evidence but, during the trial, grew to "appreciate and concur with his client's
point of view." The attorney's view was that he had "no right whatsoever to infringe
upon his decisions about his own life." Id. at 361, 710 P.2d at 929, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 1718. Statements like these led the court in Deere to exclude the possibility of a tactical
decision by the attorney, geared to gain sympathy from the jurors. In the present case,
there exists no such evidence.
56. Id. at 370, 710 P.2d at 935, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (Broussard, J., concurring).
57. See id. at 370-72, 710 P.2d at 935-37, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25 (Lucas, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that Justice Lucas took no part in the Burgener decision.
58. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 542, 714 P.2d at 1275-76, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 137.

Deere requirements? Must the jury still be admonished that it has
the right to look at all mitigating evidence? And what happens when
there is a great wealth of mitigating evidence and little for the prosecution? Must the judge then instruct the jury that it may take into
account prosecutorial evidence which was not brought forth during
the penalty phase? This demonstrates that the ever increasing scope
of the Brown decision may create eventual uncertainty and inconsistency within the penalty phase.
IV.

A.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS

Justice Mosk's Separate Concurring Opinion

Justice Mosk, while generally in concurrence with the majority
opinion, disagreed with the court's suggestion that a petition for
habeas corpus be used by defendants in cases of jury misconduct. As
a result of logistical problems with finding jurors and other evidence
at such a late date, Mosk proposed that a judgment should be made
"with finality here [at the supreme court] where the buck stops," as
opposed to passing it on to another tribunal.59

Although Mosk

agreed with the final decision of the court, he based his reasoning
upon the fact that even if the juror had been intoxicated during deliberations, there was a night's sleep and further deliberations the
next day before a verdict was issued. Such a rest period, he argued,
would have resulted in the dissipation of the intoxicants before the
60
final verdict was reached.
B.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Broussard
Justice Broussard presented a simple two sentence concurrence

with the majority opinion, citing his concurring opinion in Deere.6 1
C.

Concurringand Dissenting Opinion of Uhief Justice Bird

Chief Justice Bird, while concurring in the outcome of the majority
opinion as to the need for mitigating evidence, strongly dissented to
the court's holding that there was not ample evidence to have required the trial court to pursue an inquiry into the juror's condition.
Her dissent was based primarily upon her interpretation of the
59. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 543, 714 P.2d at 1276, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 138 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
60. Id. at 543-44, 714 P.2d at 1276-77, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 138 (Mosk, J., concurring).
Mosk's analysis was based upon an analogy between the present case and People v.
Crocker, 47 Cal. 2d 348, 303 P.2d 753 (1956) (the fact that the majority of jurors drank
the night before the verdict was determined did not constitute reversible error as the
effects of intoxication would have disappeared the next day).
61. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d at 544, 714 P.2d at 1277, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 138 (Broussard,
J., concurring).
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court's previous decision in McNeal which would require reversal of
verdicts where a trial court failed to inquire into a juror's condition,
no matter what arguments or objections were raised by defense counsel.62 In addition to the general logistical problems which the defendant would face, if relitigation of the juror's competence was in
order, Chief Justice Bird argued that the juror in question would
most certainly lie upon the witness stand to save his own skin. 63 She
therefore concluded that a petition for habeas corpus would not increase the amount of evidence available to a tribunal. Therefore, a
decision should be made by the supreme court.
Chief Justice Bird failed to distinguish McNeal in that it represented a situation in which the jurors themselves had brought into
question their impartiality.64 In any event, her criticism of the court
for failing to follow the rule laid down by McNeal lacks merit for the
simple reason that the court of appeal case was of no precedential
value with respect to the supreme court. In addition, the lengthy argument of difficulty in finding evidence and the probability of the affected jurors perjuring themselves on the stand, may be used against
any situation which requires a party to seek out evidence in preparation for trial. The potential for perjury and waste of evidence are
present in any courtroom situation, even at the initial trial stage. If
we were to determine our protocol based upon these fears, an entire
new system of justice would have to be implemented.
V.

CONCLUSION

The court's decision in Burgener is another indication that the
supreme court is stretching existing doctrine in order to avoid implementing the California death penalty statute. On its face, the argument that a lack of mitigating evidence cheats the state out of its
right to fairly determine the constitutional use of the death penalty is
sound. However, the court fails to discuss the rationally related situation of what happens when a defendant produces mitigating evidence which is minimal or actually harmful to their case. How will
62. Id. at 545-47, 714 P.2d at 1277-78, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 139-40. (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting). See also note 41 and accompanying text.
63. Id. at 548-49, 714 P.2d at 1275-80, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 141. (Bird, C.J., concurring
and dissenting) (general logistical problems mentioned by Chief Justice Bird included
the difficulty in finding witnesses and the inability of witnesses to recall exactly what
had happened).

64. McNeal, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 830, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 706.

the court handle such a situation given the "societal protection"
rationale?
The court's holding that a petition for habeas corpus is required
when an issue arises as to the failure of a trial court to dismiss or interrogate a juror when such a lack of evidence exists at the appellate
stage is sound. It would be contrary to our system of justice for an
appellate court to determine whether a person was or was not intoxicated without allowing that person to testify. The desire of some to
mitigate the hardships found by the defendant should not be allowed
to overshadow a person's ability to defend himself.
ROBERT W. LANGHOLZ, JR.

B. Special circumstance of murder-during-the-course-ofa-robbery cannot be found to exist unless the
defendant had the specific intent to kill: People v.
Ratliff.
In People v. Ratliff, 41 Cal. 3d 675, 715 P.2d 665, 224 Cal. Rptr. 705
(1986), the supreme court reversed an attempted murder conviction
and set aside the felony-murder special circumstance, thereby reversing the imposition of the death penalty. The court affirmed in all
other respects. In so doing, the court made specific rulings in the areas of voluntary consent to a search, prosecutorial misconduct, and
imposition of the special circumstance of murder-in-the-course-of-arobbery.
The defendant was tried and convicted for the armed robbery of a
San Pedro gas station and the murder of the attendant. The court
admitted the evidence that was seized in two warrantless searches of
the defendant's car. In addition, the court refused to suppress the
line-up or in-court identification of the defendant, although police
photographs used for the initial identification had been destroyed.
The jury returned guilty verdicts on charges of first degree murder,
attempted murder, robbery, and burglary. The jury also found that
the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery, thereby
constituting a special circumstance warranting the imposition of the
death penalty.
The defendant first contended that the warrantless search of his
car by the police officers immediately following his arrest was illegal,
requiring the fruits of the search to be suppressed. Although the defendant had given his consent to the search, he claimed that it was
not given voluntarily because the police officers first approached him
with their guns drawn, failed to give him the Mirandawarnings, and
handcuffed him. The court declined to hold, as a matter of law, that
consent to a search is invalid solely because a police officer initially
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drew his weapon when confronting the defendant. The court stated
that even if the officers had initially drawn their weapons, there was
no evidence to indicate that their guns were still drawn when the
consent to the search was made. In this case, the officers clearly indicated to the defendant that his permission was being requested for
the search, and he consented. The fact that the defendant was handcuffed does not make his consent invalid. Restraint by handcuffs is
but one factor to be considered in judging the voluntariness of consent to a search. Finally, previous cases have held that failure to give
the Miranda warnings does not render consent to a search involuntary. See People v. James, 19 Cal. 3d 99, 561 P.2d 1135, 137 Cal. Rptr.
447 (1977).
The defendant also challenged his conviction based on allegations
of prosecutorial misconduct. In his closing argument, the district attorney referred to the fact that the defendant had been positively
identified by one of the victims at the preliminary hearing. This fact,
however, was not in evidence. Also, the prosecutor remarked on the
failure of the defense to present any evidence showing that the defendant did not commit the charged offenses, and that the defendant
argued that this diminished his constitutional right to remain silent.
The court summarily disposed of these contentions, observing that
when the defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's statements at
trial, the present objections were waived. However, the court went
on to say (in dicta) that the prosecutor's statements were not objectionable on the grounds asserted by the defendant. A defendant's
right to remain silent covers only a prosecutor's references to a defendant's failure to take the stand and testify in his own defense.
This protection does not extend to comments on the state of the evidence or on the failure of the defense to introduce material evidence
or call logical witnesses.
Finally, the defendant contended that with respect to the felonymurder special circumstance, the jury was never instructed that a
specific intent to kill was required. The prosecutor conceded that the
trial court erred in its instructions, but argued that the error was
harmless because the defendant's intent was established by the evidence. The supreme court disagreed, refusing to accept the prosecutor's contention that the method of killing established the
defendant's intent to commit murder. Shooting a victim at close
range, although strongly indicative of an intent to kill, cannot conclusively establish the intent to kill as a matter of law. Furthermore, if
the defendant had realized that intent was relevant to the special cir-

cumstance charge, he might well have submitted evidence of brain
damage, since this evidence was indeed presented during the penalty
phase of the trial. Therefore, the special circumstance finding and
the death penalty judgment were set aside.
JEFF BOYKIN

V.

EVIDENCE
A. Section 669.5 of the Evidence Code applies to growth
control ordinances enacted by initiative after the
effective date of that section, but section 65863.5 of the
Government Code does not apply to initiative measures:
Building Industry Association of Southern California, Inc. v.
City of Camarillo.

In Building Industry Association of Southern California, Inc. v.
City of Camarillo,41 Cal. 3d 810, 718 P.2d 68, 226 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1986),
the supreme court held that section 669.5 of the California Evidence
Code, which shifts the burden of proof to the city and/or county enacting a growth control ordinance to prove that such ordinance is
necessary for the protection of the public health, safety, or welfare, is
applicable to ordinances adopted by initiative after the effective date
of that section. However, section 65863.6 of the California Government Code, requiring such ordinances to contain findings as to the
public health, safety, and welfare, does not apply to initiative
measures.
On June 2, 1981, the voters of the City of Camarillo [hereinafter
the City] adopted an initiative for a growth control ordinance limiting
the number of "dwelling units" to be constructed between 1982 and
1995 [hereinafter Measure A]. Building Industry Association of
Southern California, Inc. and Pardee Construction Company filed
separate complaints, which were consolidated for trial, challenging
the validity of Measure A. In June 1983, the trial court granted partial summary judgment holding the following: 1) section 669.5 of the
Evidence Code is inapplicable to Measure A; 2) Measure A does not
conflict with sections 65302.8, 65580, 65583, or 65584 of the Government Code; 3) Measure A does not conflict with the Subdivision Map
Act; and 4) Measure A does not conflict with section 65863.6 of the
Government Code. The court of appeal, addressing only the issues of
section 669.5 of the Evidence Code and section 65863.6 of the Government Code, ruled that neither section 669.5 of the Evidence Code nor
section 65863.5 of the Government Code applied to initiatives.
In concluding that section 669.5 of the Evidence Code did apply to
initiative measures, the supreme court focused on the language of the
statute and statutory construction. The controversy centered on the
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term "governing body" in subdivision (a), and the exemption of initiatives adopted prior to the effective date of the section in subdivision (d). The City argued that the term "governing body" was not
ambiguous; therefore, its plain meaning, which excluded the electorate, should be used. See Reidman v. Brison, 217 Cal. 383, 387, 18
P.2d 947, 948 (1933). However, the court stated that the statute must
be construed as a whole and, where ambiguity and conflict exist
within the statute, the courts must look beyond the specific language
to ascertain the legislative intent. See Marrujo v. Hunt, 71 Cal. App.
3d 972, 138 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1977).
The court determined that section 669.5 is ambiguous. If the pertinent language of subdivision (a), "the governing body of a city,
county, or city and county," is taken literally, all ordinances adopted
by initiative are excluded. Therefore, subdivision (d), exempting initiative measures adopted prior to the effective date of the section,
would be meaningless. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669.5(a) (West Supp. 1986).
The legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 3252 revealed that language exempting all initiative measures in the original version of section 669.5 was deleted and subdivision (d) was added. See Lee v. City
of Monterey Park, 173 Cal. App. 3d 798, 219 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1985).
Moreover, exempting all initiatives would be inconsistent with the
legislative purpose of counteracting unjustified limitations on the local housing supply. Thus, the court concluded that section 669.5 does
apply to initiative measures adopted after the effective date of the
statute.
The court further held that section 669.5 did not "effectively bar"
the power of initiative reserved on behalf of the electorate. Section
669.5 merely requires the city or county, in which the ordinance was
adopted, to bear the burden of proving a reasonable relationship to
the public health, safety, or welfare of the population effected if the
ordinance is challenged. The court rejected the argument that proponents of an initiative would have no effective way of defending the
initiative. The court noted that the city or county has a duty to defend the ordinance, and proponents who believed that their interests
were not being vigorously defended have the right to file a motion to
intervene in the action. Furthermore, a trial court's failure to allow
intervention under such circumstances may be an abuse of discretion.
Thus, section 669.5 of the Evidence Code does not unconstitutionally
impair the initiative process.
The supreme court also upheld the court of appeal's ruling that
section 6583.6 of the Government Code did not apply to initiative

measures. That section requires a city or county to consider and balance local housing needs against the residents' public service needs
and the available fiscal and environmental resources. Further, any
ordinance passed pursuant to section 6583.6 must contain findings as
to the public health, safety, and welfare of the city or county that the
ordinance is going to promote. The court held that the legislature intended for the guidelines established in section 65863.6 of the Government Code to be followed by the governing body of the city or county
before enacting a growth control ordinance, not by the electorate
when adopting initiative measures. The guidelines could not reasonably be applied to the initiative process. It would be impractical, if
not impossible, to prove that the voters did in fact balance the enumerated factors. Moreover, requiring documentation of the findings
to be included in the ordinance would substantially impair the initiative process by placing an unreasonable burden upon it.
STEPHANIE FANOS

B. Evidence at a criminal trial relating to third-party
culpability is admissible if it raises a reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of defendant: People v. Hall.
In People v. Hall, 41 Cal. 3d 826, 718 P.2d 99, 226 Cal. Rptr. 112
(1986), the court elucidated the applicable standard for admitting evidence of third-party guilt in criminal trials. The court ruled that evidence which tends to show culpability in one other than the
defendant is admissible if it meets the minimum requirement of raising a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. To the extent that
previous decisions applying the so-called Mendez-Arline rule were at
variance with Hall, they were overruled.
The facts revealed that defendant Hall was implicated in a murder
by an informant. The informant stated that Hall boasted to him
about the details of the murder. The informant's account of the particular circumstances surrounding the death was so accurate that
Hall was arrested for first degree murder. At trial, the defense proffered evidence intended to prove that the informant, rather than
Hall, was actually the murderer. This evidence included facts such as
the informant's intimate knowledge of the distinctive characteristics
of the murder. Furthermore, the defense's argument was supported
by the likelihood that the fatal blow was administered by a lefthanded person, together with proof that Hall was right-handed and
the informant was left-handed, the informant had a history as a pathological liar and as a violent drunk, and also that the informant had
possession of shoes capable of making tracks such as those found at
the murder site.
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The trial court refused to admit the evidence based on its determination that it did not rise above the Mendez-Arline test, which required that the evidence provide a probable ground for suspecting the
third-party. The court cited its discretion, under section 352 of the
Evidence Code, to exclude evidence it deemed unduly time consuming, unnecessarily prejudicial, confusing, or misleading. CAL. EVID.
CODE § 352 (West 1966). Nonetheless, the defense managed to present most of the implicating evidence to the jury. Despite the implication of the informant, Hall was convicted. He appealed on the basis
that the trial court's exclusion of evidence of third-party guilt was
prejudicial. The appellate court and supreme court affirmed the conviction. The supreme court held that although the trial court's application of the Mendez-Arline rule was erroneous, the error was
harmless given that the majority of the exculpating evidence was introduced notwithstanding the refused proffer.
The Mendez-Arline threshold admissibility test, used by the trial
court to determine whether to allow evidence of third-party guilt, derived from the cases of People v. Mendez, 193 Cal. 39, 223 P. 65 (1924)
and People v. Arline, 13 Cal. App. 3d 200, 91 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1970). In
Mendez, the court held inadmissible evidence that a feasible motive
for the crime rested in third parties. Thus, Mendez stood for the
proposition that evidence casting possible suspicion on a third party is
insufficient to merit admission. Mendez, 193 Cal. at 51, 223 P. at 70.
The state of the law subsequent to Mendez was that evidence of
third-party guilt which merely cast a possible suspicion on another
was inadmissible, but evidence somewhat less than that needed to
sustain a conviction of the third-party could be presented.
This vague standard was refined in Arline, 13 Cal. App. 3d at 204,
91 Cal. Rptr. at 522. In Arline, the court ruled that evidence implicating a third-party should be excluded unless it provided substantial
proof or probability that the third-party actually committed the
crime.
The decision in Hall overruled the elevated standard of Arline.
Hall redirected the focus of the inquiry from whether the evidence
sufficiently implicated the third-party to whether the evidence sufficiently casted doubt on the defendant's guilt. Under Hall, a defendant need only provide enough evidence linking the third-party to the
crime with which the defendant is charged to raise a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt. Once it is found that the evidence
raises a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, it is
admissible.

The Hall court reiterated that mere evidence of motive or opportunity alone is insufficient. The court also cautioned that the policy
considerations of section 352 of the Evidence Code still applied.
Therefore, evidence of third-party guilt was still required to be relevant and able to outweigh any risk of undue delay, prejudice, or confusion its introduction into the trial might cause. Hall, 41 Cal. 3d at
834, 718 P.2d at 104, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
The court in Hall also rejected the defendant's attack on section
352 of the Evidence Code as violating his constitutional right to present a defense. Hall argued that the federal standard enumerated in
Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891), applied to his case. In
Alexander the court held that only evidence containing no legitimate
exculpating tendencies should be excluded. Id. The Hall court dismissed this argument with reference to Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Hall, 41 Cal. 3d. at 835, 718 P.2d at 105, 226 Cal.
Rptr. at 118. (Rule 403 is the Federal counterpart to Evidence Code
section 352).
In Hall, the court found an opportunity to redefine the threshold
standard for the admission of evidence of third-party guilt. The ruling of Hall, that evidence is admissible if, at a minimum, it casts a
reasonable doubt on defendant's guilt, lowered the previous MendezArline standard. This previous standard held that evidence would be
excluded unless it provided substantial proof or probability that the
third-party committed the crime with which defendant was being
prosecuted. Hall also confirmed the constitutional validity of section
352 of the Evidence Code which was challenged because it provided a
state court with discretion to exclude evidence which a federal court
might have admitted.
The fact that the Mendez-Arline test was overruled in the Hall decision was of no benefit to Hall himself. The court found that the
trial court's erroneous application of the restrictive standard did not
amount to prejudicial error because Hall was able to introduce most
of the exculpating evidence he sought to admit.
VALERIE

L.

FLORES

C. Section 1157 of the Evidence Code does not preclude a
hospital medical review staff committee member from
voluntarily testifying about proceedings of the
committee: West Covina Hospital v. Superior Court.
In West Covina Hospital v. Superior Court,41 Cal. 3d 846, 718 P.2d
119, 226 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1986), the supreme court held that pursuant
to section 1157 of the Evidence Code, a hospital medical review staff
committee member may not be required to testify, but may volunta-
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rily testify about committee proceedings, provided patients' names
are not disclosed.
In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff sued a surgeon and
West Covina Hospital for negligently granting surgical privileges and
retaining the allegedly negligent surgeon on its medical staff. The
plaintiff planned to call Dr. Anwar, who served on a medical review
committee which evaluated the surgeon, to testify about specific details of the committee's evaluation. The trial court, over objections
by the hospital, held that Dr. Anwar could waive the exclusion of
section 1157 of the Evidence Code and could testify to the proceedings of the staff meeting as long as the patients' names were not
disclosed.
The court of appeal granted the writ of mandate sought by the hospital, compelling the trial court to vacate its order and to exclude the
testimony of Dr. Anwar. The supreme court directed the court of appeal to vacate its writ, holding that a hospital medical review committee staff member was not precluded from voluntarily testifying about
the proceedings of the committee.
The court held that the critical language of section 1157(b), "no
person in attendance at a meeting of any of those committees shall be
required to testify as to what transpired at that meeting," is construed to preclude involuntary testimony only. CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1157(b) (West Supp. 1986). A provision excluding required testimony does not prevent all testimony, nor does it confer a privilege
upon the hospital or committee to preclude testimony.
The court noted that the care with which the legislature drafted
the other provisions in the same chapter reinforces the conclusion
that the legislature knew what it was saying when it excluded required testimony, as opposed to an absolute bar on all testimony from
a committee member. Tracy v. Municipal Court, 22 Cal. 3d 760, 764,
587 P.2d 227, 229, 150 Cal. Rptr. 785, 787 (1977). Moreover, the principle that privileges should be construed narrowly so as not to bar relevant evidence and obstruct justice, bolsters the conclusion that
section 1157 excludes only involuntary testimony, not voluntary testimony. People v. McGraw, 141 Cal. App. 3d 618, 622, 190 Cal. Rptr.
461, 463 (1983). There is also a well established rule that when the
legislature amends a statute, without changing a provision that has
previously been judicially construed, it is deemed to have acquiesced
in that construction. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721,
734, 640 P.2d 115, 123, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 504 (1982). Additionally, the
court stated that when the language of the statute is clear and unam-

biguous, as it is in section 1157, courts should give effect to its plain
meaning.
The court stated that the fundamental legislative purpose of section 1157 of the Evidence Code is "to improve the quality of medical
care in the hospitals by the use of peer review committees." West
Covina Hospital,41 Cal. 3d. at 851, 718 P.2d at 122, 226 Cal. Rptr. at
135. In order to recruit doctors to serve on these committees, the legislature concluded that it was necessary to exempt them from being
required to testify about their committee work; this is because testifying would consume a large portion of their time and effort and discourage them from serving on the committees. However, a doctor
who voluntarily decides to testify is willing to expend the time and
effort involved and thus, the legislative purpose would not be
thwarted.
The court also stated that there are two competing public policies
at issue here: 1) the need for external access to medical review committees in order for plaintiffs to gain access to relevant evidence; and
2) the need for confidentiality in these committees in order to effectively increase candor and objectivity. Section 1157 of the Evidence
Code reflects the balanced approach of the legislature. Recognizing
these competing policies, the legislature chose to draw the line at involuntary testimony, thus providing for the admission of voluntary
testimony in order to facilitate a plaintiff's need for evidence.
STEPHANIE FANOS

VI.

FAMILY LAW
Retroactive applicationof section 4800.2 of the California
Civil Code to cases which were pending appeal at the
time of enactment is unconstitutionalas it substantially
alters individual property rights andfails to promote a
significant state interest in redressinga prior inequity
in existing law: In re Marriage of Fabian.

In In re Marriage of Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d 440, 715 P.2d 253, 224 Cal.
Rptr. 333 (1986), the California Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether section 4800.2 of the California Civil Code should retroactively apply to marital settlement cases initiated prior to the enactment of the statute but where judgment was not rendered until after
such enactment. Section 4800.2 applies directly to the division of
community property upon settlement of divorce. The statute provides, in pertinent part, that unless there is a written waiver to the
contrary, a "party shall be reimbursed for his or her contributions to
the acquisition of the [community] property to the extent the party
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traces the contributions to a separate property source." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1986).
In Fabian,James and Kathleen Fabian had purchased a motel during their marriage, with title specifying that the motel was to be community property. A total of $275,000 of separate property had been
invested by James into the motel, with net equity at the time of the
trial determined to be $790,391. Since there was no agreement between the parties to the contrary, the trial court ruled that James'
contribution should be considered a gift to the community; therefore,
James was not entitled to reimbursement. From this ruling James
appealed.
The supreme court first concluded that the trial court did not err
in its finding that the motel was in fact community property in its
entirety. The court based its conclusion primarily upon the fact that
the motel had been acquired in the names of James and Kathleen "as
community property." As property acquired during marriage is presumed community in nature, particularly when the title itself specifies such, a party must prove the existence of an agreement to the
contrary in order to preempt such a presumption. Such an agreement must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence and, in the
instant case, the court found no such preponderance to exist. See In
re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853
(1980); See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966)
(both cases standing for the general presumption that community
property acquired during marriage with separate property contributions is presumed community property in its entirety unless agreement to the contrary is shown to exist by an objective view of the
evidence).
The court then addressed the issue of retroactivity. Assembly Bill
26, section 4, which incorporated section 4800.2, was enacted while
the present appeal was pending. The court emphasized the fact that
the law prior to enactment of section 4800.2 set forth in Lucas, did
not allow for reimbursement unless such was specifically agreed to
by the parties. Therefore, until the enactment of section 4800.2,
Kathleen possessed a vested property interest in the motel. The
court then looked to its previous decision in In re Marriage of Buol,
39 Cal. 3d 751, 705 P.2d 354, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1985), for guidance as
to what standard to apply in determining the constitutionality of the
retroactivity of section 4800.2.
. In Buol, the court had determined that section 4800.1, contained in
Assembly Bill 26 along with section 4800.2, could not be retroactively

applied to cases which were pending appeal at the time of enactment.
In determining the constitutionality of retroactive application, the
court balanced the state interest against the overall justifiable reliance by citizens upon the former law. The court in Buol distinguished section 4800.1 from other retroactive statutory applications
which it had previously upheld on the basis that those 'constitutional'
applications were "necessary to remedy 'the rank injustice of the former law.'" The court could find no such rank injustice with respect
to section 4800.1. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 761, 705 P.2d at 360, 218 Cal.
Rptr. at 37 (quoting In re Marriageof Boquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 594, 546
P.2d 1371, 1377, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 433 (1976); see also Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 567, 399 P.2d 897,902-03, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102-03
(1965) (implies 'injustice' standard, but does not specifically state it as
seen above)).
In applying the rationale used in Buol to section 4800.2, the court
found that "[a]bsent patent unfairness in the former law, retroactivity of section 4800.2 is wholly unnecessary." Fabian,41 Cal. 3d at 449,
715 P.2d at 258, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338. Reasoning that the legal status
of separate property could be easily maintained under the law existing prior to section 4800.2 by simple agreement between the parties, there was necessarily no patent unfairness upon which
retroactivity could be justified.
The supreme court found that section 4800.2 of the Civil Code results in a significant infringement upon vested property rights and
not merely the changing of a procedural rule. The court generally
looks to the true substantive effect of a statute in question as opposed
to its facial appearance in determining constitutionality. However,
the line between the two poles is not always clear; therefore, the
judgment of the court as to the eventual classification may often be
the result of the desired outcome more than the result of a set judicial test. See generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
ConstitutionalLaw §§ 282-83, 285-88 (8th ed. 1974) (general discussion of retroactive applicability of statutes); Laughran, Management
and Control of Community Property in California: "Retroactive"
Application of the 1795 Amendments, 9 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 493, 514-20
(1976) (no clear line as to when retroactivity of community property
statutes overstep constitutional boundaries); Comment, Retroactive
Application of California Civil Code Section 4800.1: ProceduralRule
or Violation of Due Process?, 16 PAC. L.J. 1007, 1013-17 (1985) (general discussion of court review of retroactive application of community property statutes).
Buol alone might easily have been overlooked as an anomoly in the
court's general approach of leaning toward retroactivity. Prior to
Buol and Fabian,it was generally accepted that the legislature's in-
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terest in the marital relationship, and any inequity which existed

within it, was a sufficient ground to allow for retroactivity of applicable statutes. See Shue and Velman, CaliforniaCivil Code 4800.1 and
4800.2: Review, Analysis, and Suggestions for Reform, 12 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 5, 11-14 (1985) (discussion of the judiciary's previous
rulings upon retroactivity). However, when considered along with
the court's opinion in Fabian,there is some justification for the opinion that the court is becoming more conservative in its approach to
legislative enactment, at least insofar as it relates to the law surrounding community property interests. The cases indicate most certainly that the court will not allow the legislature to injure such
vested rights with total impunity. There must not only be an injustice which such retroactivity seeks to remedy, but such injustice must
be "substantial" as well.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the court's decision in
Fabian is not the specific holding for which it stands. Rather, the
most important aspect may well be the decision's potential indication
that the court is taking a more conservative and watchful view with
respect to retroactive application of statutes which infringe upon
property rights. Such a conservative stance would allow the court to
disallow the retroactivity of such statutes not only with respect to situations in which an appeal is pending at the time of enactment, but
also to those property interests to which no legal claim has yet been

placed. Requiring the average property owner to employ counsel
each time a statute is passed by the legislature to scrutinize its effects
upon their vested property interests is patently inequitable and cannot be reasonably expected. The legislature's ability to retroactively
redefine vested property rights should be strictly limited to those
minimal situations in which equity cries out for such a harsh change.
Therefore, the only fair test to determine the constitutionality of retroactive application would be to use the same basis of scrutiny as was
applied in both Fabian and Buol, assuring an overwhelming governmental need to intervene.
ROBERT W. LANGHOLZ, JR.

VII.

LABOR LAW
A.

Local public agencies must give notice to and meet and
confer with representativesof a recognized employee
bargainingunit prior to eliminating and reassigning
employment positions pursuant to the Meyers-MiliasBrown Act: Building Material & Construction Teamsters'
Union, Local 216 v. Farrell.

In Building Material & Construction Teamsters' Union, Local 216
v. Farrell,41 Cal. 3d 651, 715 P.2d 648, 224 Cal. Rptr. 688 (1986), the
supreme court held that a public agency's failure to give notice to or
to meet and confer with representatives of the union's bargaining
unit prior to eliminating and reassigning employment positions violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act [hereinafter the Act]. CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 3500-3510 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). The defendants' unilateral actions fell within the scope of representation as defined by the
Act, and thus constituted a violation of the Act.
The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act was enacted to encourage communications between public employers and employees, and to improve
personnel management and employer-employee relations. The Act
effectuates these goals by giving local government employees the
right to organize collectively and to be represented by employee organizations. In addition, employers are under a duty to bargain with
employee representatives regarding matters that fall within the
"scope of representation." Section 3504 of the Government Code defines "scope of representation" to include "all matters relating to employment conditions and employer-employee relations, including, but
not limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment ..... " CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3504 (West 1980). The phrase ex-

empts from consideration the "merits, necessity, or organization of
any service or activity provided by law or executive order." Id. See
generally 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts, § 410
(8th ed. 1974).
Pursuant to the Act, public agencies must give employee organizations written notice of any proposed actions relating to matters
within the scope of representation. Furthermore, representatives of
both the agencies and employee organizations must meet and confer
if either party so requests.
The Department of Public Health [hereinafter DPH] eliminated
two truck driver positions from their hospital budget that were
within the union's bargaining unit: one vacant, full-time position, and
one part-time position filled by Antone Metaxas. Simultaneously,
three new full-time utility worker positions were created that were
not within the bargaining unit. The three new workers were to be
responsible for fulfilling the duties assigned to the two eliminated po-
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sitions. DPH's actions were reviewed and subsequently approved by
the San Francisco Civil Service Commission [hereinafter the Commission]. Although Metaxas was transferred to a full-time position
as truck driver at another hospital, the plaintiff filed a grievance on
behalf of Metaxas, alleging that Metaxas was improperly denied his
part-time position. Additionally, the plaintiff requested that the
DPH and the Commission meet and confer regarding the reorganization and reclassification of positions. DPH and the Commission denied these requests, arguing that these matters were not within the
meet and confer obligations imposed on public agencies. The plaintiff
subsequently sought a writ of mandate to compel the defendants to
reinstate Mr. Metaxas with back pay. The trial court held that the
meet and confer requirements were not applicable, and the court of
appeal affirmed.
In attempting to define "scope of representation," the supreme
court looked to both state and federal law for guidance. E.g.,
Fibreboard Corp. v. Labor Board, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Soule Glass &
Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981); Dublin Professional Fire Fighters,Local 1885, AFL-CIO v. Valley Community Services Dist., 45 Cal. App. 3d 116, 119 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1975). A review of
these cases illustrates that an action must have a significant effect on
the "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" of
the bargaining unit in order to fall within the scope of representation
and, thus, invoke the mandatory bargaining requirement. Farrell,41
Cal. 3d at 659, 715 P.2d at 652, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 692. Any permanent
transfer of work away from a bargaining unit has a significant effect
on the wages, hours, and other terms of employment; consequently,
courts have held that an employer is required to bargain if the transfer adversely affects the bargaining unit in question.
An adverse effect has been held to occur where positions have been
terminated and work has been transferred to independent contractors and where an employer has transferred bargaining unit work to
nonbargaining unit employees. Farrell,41 Cal. 3d at 659, 715 P.2d at
652, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 692. The supreme court applied these principles
to the present case where positions were terminated within the bargaining unit and reassigned to positions outside the bargaining unit
which were expressly created to perform that work. The court concluded that the reorganization and reclassification of positions by the
DPH adversely effected the bargaining unit and its employees. By
refusing to meet and confer with representatives, the DPH and the
Commission violated the specific provisions of the Act.

The defendants argued that their actions fell within the fundamental managerial policy exception to the Act. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 3504
(West 1980). This "general managerial policy" exception, developed
by the federal courts, was incorporated into section 3504 and excepts
the "merits, necessity, or organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive order" from the scope of representation.
Id. The court summarily rejected this argument by declaring that
the reorganization and reclassification of positions was not fundamental since it had no effect on public services. Rather, those actions
had a significant effect on the wages, hours and working conditions of
the employees in the bargaining unit; thus, they were a proper subject for negotiation.
The court further held that the provisions of the San Francisco
Charter [hereinafter the Charter] are compatible with the meet and
confer requirements of the Act. Although the Charter gives the
Commission the right to "reclassify" and "relocate," this power is not
inconsistent with the requirement to meet and confer with representatives about the proposed classifications before the changes take effect. In addition, the Charter does not prohibit the Commission from
negotiating before any changes are implemented.
TAMI J. TAECKER
B.

The Agriculture Labor Relations Board can appoint
independent hearing officers to conduct hearings to
determine whether a disputed election of a bargaining
agent should be certified and that independent officer
can make findings, conclusions, and
recommendations: Lindeleaf v. Agricultural Labor
Relations Board.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Lindeleaf v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board,1 the supreme
court held that title 8, section 203070(a), (f) of the California Administrative Code2 did not violate section 1156.3(c) of the California La1. 41 Cal. 3d 861, 718 P.2d 106, 226 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1986). Justice Mosk wrote the
majority opinion in which Acting Chief Justice Broussard and Justices Reynoso and
Grodin concurred. Justice Panelli authored a separate dissenting opinion in which
Justices Lucas and Low concurred. Justice Low was assigned by the chairperson of
the judicial counsel.
2. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 20370(a), (f) (1986). Subdivison (a) reads, in pertinent part: "The executive secretary shall appoint an investigative hearing examiner to
conduct an investigative hearing on objections filed .... No person who is an official
or an employee of a regional office shall be appointed to act as an investigative hearing
examiner." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 20370(a) (1986).
Subdivision (f) in pertinent part reads as follows: "Within a reasonable time after
the close of taking of testimony, the investigative hearing examiner shall issue an ini-
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bor Code. 3 In addition, the court upheld the Agriculture Labor
Relations Board's [hereinafter ALRB or the Board] summary dismissal of Lindeleaf's allegations as not providing a prima facie evidentiary basis for a charge of election misconduct. The court further
held that the ALRB did not abuse its discretion in overruling, as unmeritorious, Lindeleaf's objections which were referred to an investigative hearing, and upheld the ALRB's imposition of a make-whole
order on Lindeleaf.
II.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

On August 29, 1980, the United Farm Workers [hereinafter UFW]
filed a petition with the ALRB seeking certification as the exclusive
bargaining agent for the agricultural employees of Robert Lindeleaf.
UFW was the decisive winner in a subsequent election.4 Lindeleaf
filed eleven objections with the ALRB that allegedly warranted setting aside the election. The ALRB's executive secretary summarily
dismissed some of these objections in their entirety and others in
part. Lindeleaf filed a request for review, and the ALRB set four issues for hearing.
An investigative hearing examiner [hereinafter IHE] conducted the
hearing and determined that the objections were uniformly unmeritorious and did not affect the outcome of the election. The Board affirmed the IHE's rulings, findings, and conclusions, and adopted her
recommendation to certify the UFW.
Lindeleaf refused to bargain with the UFW, and the union filed
charges of unfair labor practices. The ALRB determined that
Lindeleaf's refusal to bargain constituted an unfair labor practice.
Therefore, the ALRB ordered the parties to bargain in good faith,
and imposed a make-whole sanction on Lindeleaf, requiring reimbursement to present and former employees who suffered pay and
other economic losses as a result of the refusal to bargain.
Lindeleaf petitioned the court of appeal for review, contending that
the ALRB abused its discretion in summarily dismissing and overrultial decision including findings of fact, conclusions of law, a statement of reasons in
support of the conclusions, and a recommended disposition of the case." CAL. ADMIN.
CODE

tit. 8, § 20370(f) (1986).

3. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1156.3(c) (West Supp. 1986). This section reads in pertinent
part: "Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or employee of a regional office of
the board. He shall make no recommendations with respect thereto." Id.
4. Election results: UFW-71; no-union-35; void-i; challenged ballots-4. Lindeleaf,
41 Cal. 3d at 868, 718 P.2d at 111, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 123.

ing his objections. For the first time, Lindeleaf challenged the
ALRB's delegation of authority to an investigative hearing examiner
to issue findings and to recommend a decision as contravening an express mandate of the Agriculture Labor Relations Act of 1975 [hereinafter ALRA].5 The court of appeal annulled the ALRB's decision,
holding that the ALRB improperly delegated its authority to the IHE
and that three of Lindeleaf's summarily rejected objections required
a full hearing. It remanded the matter to the ALRB for reconsideration without reference to the IHE's findings, conclusions, and
recommendations.
III.
A.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

Proprietyof Issues Before the Court

Initially, the supreme court had to determine whether Lindeleaf's
challenge to the Board's hearing procedures were properly before the
court, since it was not raised before the Board. In cases involving administrative regulations, a petitioner is generally required to exhaust
all his administrative remedies before redress in the courts is allowed, and is deemed to have waived any objections that were not
raised before the administrative agency. 6 Recognizing the principle
that the court may agree to hear a case involving important questions
of public policy, 7 the court elected to address this issue.
B. Selection and Duties of Investigative Hearing Examiners
Lindeleaf maintained that section 20370(a) and section 20370(f) of
the California Administrative Codes contravened the language of section 1156.2(c) of the California Labor Code,9 contending that the administrative regulations prohibited what the statute allowed
(hearings conducted by regional ALRB office employees and officers)
and required what the statute prohibited (findings and recommendations by IHE).1o The court, however, disagreed.
First, the court noted that section 1156.3(c) of the Labor Code provided for a hearing to determine certification of a disputed election,
and section 1142(b) of the Labor Code authorized the ALRB to appoint hearing officers to conduct those hearings.1" If those officers
5. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-66.3 (West Supp. 1986).
6. 41 Cal. 3d at 869, 718 P.2d at 111, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
7. 41 Cal. 3d at 870-71, 718 P.2d at 112, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
8. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 20370(a), (f) (1986). See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
9. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1156.3(c) (West Supp. 1986). See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
10. 41 Cal. 3d at 871, 718 P.2d at 112, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
11. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1142(b) (West Supp. 1986). This section, in pertinent part,
reads as follows:
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were not allowed to reach preliminary determinations their "function
would be rendered nugatory," thwarting the purposes of the legisla12
ture in enacting the statutes.
Second, section 1156.3(c) of the Labor Code provides that hearings
"may be conducted by an officer or employee of a regional office of
the Board" but it does not require that they must be so conducted.
Moreover, the ALRB has interpreted subdivision (c) to "require that
only a hearing examiner who is an officer or employee of a regional
office... [be] barred from recommending disposition of election challenges."'13 Since officers and employees of regional ALRB offices are
prohibited from issuing findings and recommendations, the ALRB, in
order to expedite its review process, enacted an administrative regulation,14 permitting independent hearing officers to conduct hearings
and prohibiting regional officers and employees from conducting
such hearings. In addition, the regulation required these independent hearing officers to issue findings and recommendations. 15 Thus,
the court held that although the regulation is narrower than the statute, it is permissible.1 6 Moreover, these regulations serve the legislative purpose of the statute by precluding a situation in which
employees of the same regional office "review the conduct of their
own colleagues during local elections."17
Third, the court rejected Lindeleaf's reading of section 1156.3(c) of
the Labor Code.' 8 Lindeleaf contended that the phrase "of a regional
office" qualified only the word "employee" and that the word "officer" referred to any officer, including independent IHE's; therefore,
this barred any person conducting the hearing from issuing findings
and recommendations. The court stated that this reading "defies
The board may delegate to the personnel of these offices such powers as it
deems appropriate to determine the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, to determine whether
a question of representation exists, to direct an election ... and to certify the
results of such election, and to investigate, conduct hearings and make determinations relating to unfair labor practices.
Id.
12. 41 Cal. 3d at 872, 718 P.2d at 112, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
13. Id. at 871, 718 P.2d at 112, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
14. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 20370(a) (1986).
15. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 20370(f) (1986).
16. 41 Cal. 3d at 872, 718 P.2d at 113, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
17. Id.
18. "Such hearings may be conducted by an officer or employee of a regional office
of the Board. He shall make no recommendation with respect thereto." CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1156.3(c) (West Supp. 1986).

both grammar and sense."'19 The terms "officer and employee" must
be read together and both are qualified by the phrase "of a regional
office of the Board."20
Fourth, the court held the ALRB does not delegate its ultimate authority to THE's. An aggrieved party may file an exception to an
IHE's finding, conclusion or recommendation, triggering an independent review of the entire proceeding by the Board.21
C. Summary Dismissal of Election Objections
The court rejected Lindeleaf's claim that the ALRB abused its discretion in summarily dismissing three of his objections. The court reaffirmed its decision in JR. Norton, Co. v. Agricultural Labor
Relations Board,22 which upheld the ALRB requirement that a petition for hearing must be "accompanied by a declaration or declarations which, if uncontroverted or unexplained, would constitute
23
sufficient grounds for the Board to refuse to certify the election."
A petitioner must present a prima facie case before it can command
24
an evidentiary hearing.
The court noted that although the ALRA does not specifically
state that a prima facie showing is required, the ALRB has the statutory authority to adopt "such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the ALRA]."25

Thus, since

Lindeleaf's objections were not sufficiently supported by factual declarations, the ALRB acted properly in summarily dismissing them.
Lindeleaf failed to support his claim that UFW organizers campaigned for the union immediately before and during the balloting.
The ALRB has held that "last-minute electioneering in the polling
place does not warrant setting aside an election unless it continues
26
during actual voting or is intimidating and coercive to employees."
The court stated that Lindeleaf's declaration raising this issue did
not explicitly state that the campaigning occurred during the actual
voting nor that the declarant or any other person alleged voter coercion or intimidation.27 Similarly, a prima facie showing of pre-election misconduct was not established in declarations which alleged
that UFW organizers threatened employees. The declarations stated
that the threats occurred after the election and Lindeleaf failed to
19. 41 Cal. 3d at 872, 718 P.2d at 113, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 126.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
8, § 20365(g) (1986).
26 Cal. 3d 1, 603 P.2d 1306, 160 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1979).
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 20365 (1986).
41 Cal. 3d at 874, 718 P.2d at 114, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit.

25. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1144 (West Supp. 1986).

26. 41 Cal. 3d at 875, 718 P.2d at 115, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
27. Id.

[Vol. 14: 163, 1986]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

show how the subsequent threats affected the outcome of the
election.
Finally, the court agreed with the ALRB that Lindeleaf failed to
provide sufficient evidence to establish that the Board's rejection of
Carlos Acevedo as a union observer was prejudicial.28
D.

Election Objections Referred to an Investigative Hearing

The court held that the ALRB did not abuse its discretion by referring Lindeleaf's objections to an IHE. In addition, the court adopted
the IHE's recommendations.29
Once again, Lindeleaf failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his allegations of the UFW threats to workers that they would
lose their jobs if the union won and they did not vote for the union.
Recognizing "the rule that an election must be set aside if employees
were coerced into voting for the union," 30 the court agreed with the
ALRB that the testimony of Lindeleaf's witnesses regarding this
charge was inadmissible as hearsay.3 1 Therefore, the Board properly
dismissed this objection.
Lindeleaf further claimed that the ALRB did not act promptly in
removing a UFW organizer from a "quarantined area" and, as a result, the organizer was able to speak in Spanish to one of its employees. Although Lindeleaf's witness testified about this incident, he
was unable to determine the content of the conversation because he
did not speak Spanish. The court characterized the event as trivial,
and agreed with the Board that Lindeleaf failed to produce adequate
evidence to support his claim.32
Lindeleaf next contended that the election should be set aside due
to the ALRB's failure to seek proper voter identification and its refusal to note challenges individually. Challenged voters were allowed
to vote "after being recognized and identified by a UFW observer."3 3
However, the court noted that voter identification may be in the
form of "any .

.

. identification which the Board agent, in his or her

discretion, deems adequate" 34 and recognition of an employee "'may,
at the discretion of a board agent, constitute adequate identifi28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 876, 718 P.2d at 115, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
Id. at 876, 718 P.2d at 115-16, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29.
Id. at 877, 718 P.2d at 116, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 129 (period omitted).
Id.; see CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 20370(c) (1986).
41 Cal. 3d at 878, 718 P.2d at 116, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
Id. at 878, 718 P.2d at 117, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 20355(c) (1986) (period omitted).

cation.' "35
The final objection referred to the hearing involving alleged access
violations. Lindeleaf claimed that UFW organizers repeatedly campaigned on company property. 36 The court stated that an election
will be invalidated only when "access violations have deprived voters
of their exercise of free choice,"37 and declined to "adopt a per se
rule requiring an election to be set aside whenever access violations
have occurred." 38 The court agreed with the ALRB finding that the
violations involved were de minimis and did not effect the outcome
of the election.
E.

Imposition of Make-Whole Relief

Imposition of make-whole relief is not automatic. However, when
an employer unreasonably pursues litigation, in an attempt to thwart
the collective bargaining process after a fair election, make-whole relief is appropriate. 39 The ALRB determined that Lindeleaf's refusal
to bargain was not in good faith and his pursuit of judicial review
either lacked evidential support or had little or no effect on the outcome of the election. Under the circumstances, the court concluded
that the ALRB did not abuse its discretion in imposing make-whole
relief and awarding employees compensation for their economic loss.

IV.

DISSENT

The only issue addressed by the dissent40 was the imposition of
make-whole relief. Justice Panelli noted that the majority imposed
such relief on the basis that Lindeleaf's refusal to bargain was not in
good faith. He pointed out that a majority on the panel of the court
of appeal agreed with Lindeleaf, annulling the UFW certification.
Therefore, he contended it was "incongruous to say that Lindeleaf
pursued judicial relief in bad faith," 41 and inappropriate to grant
make-whole relief, absent other justification.
V.

CONCLUSION

Even though the administrative regulation was narrower than the
labor statute, the supreme court held that the ALRB could appoint
35.
Inc., 1
36.
37.
38.

41 Cal. 3d at 878, 718 P.2d at 117, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 130 (quoting Toste Farms,
ALRB No. 16, 3 (1975)).
-Id. at 879, 718 P.2d at 117, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
Id. at 879, 718 P.2d at 117-18, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31.
Id. at 879, 718 P.2d at 118, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 131.

39. Id. at 880, 718 P.2d at 118, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 131; see Comment Make-Whole Relief Under the CaliforniaAgricultural Labor Relations Act: The Ex-Cell-O Doctrine
Revisited, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1069 (1982).
40. 41 Cal. 3d at 881, 718 P.2d at 119, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 132. (Panelli, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
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independent hearing officers to conduct hearings to determine
whether or not an election of a bargaining agent should be certified.
They further held that the hearing officer could make findings of
facts, conclusions of law, and recommendations of disposition. Furthermore, the court held that in order for the regional director of the
NLRB to review alleged misconduct, the complaining party must
show a prima facie case that would warrant setting aside the election.
STEPHANIE FANOS

C. Medical housestaff paid by the Regents of the
University of California participatingin their
residency programs are employees entitled to
collective-bargainingrights: Regents of the University

of California v. Public Employment Relations Board.
INTRODUCTION
In Regents of the University of California v. Public Employment

Relations Board,' the California Supreme Court interpreted subdivision (f) of section 3562 of the California Government Code2 [hereinafter section 3562(f)] to include medical house staff for consideration as
employees within the meaning of the Higher Education EmployerEmployee Relations Act [hereinafter HEERA or the Act]. 3 The court
thereby affirmed the administrative decision of the Public Employment Relations Board [hereinafter PERB or the Board]4 that house
1. 41 Cal. 3d 601, 715 P.2d 590, 224 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1986). The opinion was written
by Chief Justice Bird. Justices Mosk, Broussard, and Reynoso concurred. A separate
dissenting opinion was written by Justice Campbell Lucas with which Justice Malcolm
Lucas concurred. Justice Campbell Lucas was assigned by the chairperson of the Judical Council.
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(f) (West Supp. 1986). This section provides:
"Employee" or "higher education employee" means any employee of the Regents of the University of California, the Directors of Hastings College of the
Law, or the Board of Trustees of the California State University, whose employment is principally within the State of California. However, managerial,
and confidential employees shall be excluded from coverage under this chapter. The board may find student employees whose employment is contingent
on their status as students are employees only if the services they provide are,
unrelated to their educational objectives, or, that those educational objectives
are subordinate to the services they perform and that coverage under this
chapter would further the purposes of this chapter.
Id. Section 3562(f) is a part of the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations
Act. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3560-99 (West Supp. 1986).
3. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3560-99 (West Supp. 1986).
4. The Public Employment Relations Board is an independent California state
agency established pursuant to section 3541 of the California Government Code and

staff5 participating in the University 6 residency programs were employees entitled to collective-bargaining rights because (1) the participants' educational objectives were subordinate to the services they
provide and (2) granting them collective-bargaining rights would fur7
ther the purposes of HEERA.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

HEERA, enacted in 1978 and effective July 1, 1979, enlarged the
number of individuals entitled to collective-bargaining rights to include employees of the University of California, Hastings College of
the Law and the California State University [hereinafter the University].8 As a result, the University refused to recognize house staff as
employees required under HEERA. The University recognized house
staff as students only, thereby precluding any collective-bargaining
rights.
A hearing before the PERB ensued, and on February 14, 1983, after
heated debate, the Board concluded that house staff were employees
within the meaning of HEERA. As a result, the Board held that
house staff were entitled to collective-bargaining rights. The Board
issued a Cease and Desist Order against the University and instructed
the University to acknowledge and accept the status of house staff as
employees.
The University sought a Writ of Review to vacate the decision of
the PERB pursuant to section 3564 of the California Government
Code.9 The court of appeal annulled the Board's decision and remanded with direction.' 0 The California Supreme Court granted the
writ to review the matter, superseding the opinion of the court of appeal, and affirmed the Board's conclusion.
consists of five members. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3541 (West Supp. 1986). The Board has
the power to conduct studies relating to employer-employee relations and determine
employer-employee disputes regarding wages, hours, and other conditions of employment between public and state employee organizations. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3512,

3541, 4541.3 (West Supp. 1986).
5. Medical interns, residents, and clinical fellows paid by the university in which
the individual participates. Public Employment Relations Bd., 41 Cal. 3d at 604 n.1, 715

P.2d at 591 n.1, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 632 n.1.
6. The "University" refers to the University of California, Hastings College of
the Law, and the California State University.
7. Public Employment Relations Bd., 41 Cal. 3d at 601, 715 P.2d at 590, 224 Cal.
Rptr. at 631.

8. The University operates medical schools at five of its campuses: San Francisco
(UCSF), Los Angeles (UCLA), Davis (UCD), Irvine (UCI), and San Diego (UCSD).
For a comprehensive study on this subject see Brownstein, Medical Housestaff: Scholars or Working Stiffs? The Pending PERB Decision, 12 PAC. L.J. 1127 (1981).
9. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 3564(c) (West 1980).
10. Regents of University of Californiav. Public Employment Relations Bd., 158
Cal. App. 3d 688, 205 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1984).
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III.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

The first issue resolved by the court was whether HEERA barred
house staff from being considered employees. In its analysis the
court reviewed both the statutory language and legislative intent behind HEERA. The court held that the statute's language left open
the potential for house staff to fall within its scope, and that the legislature's intent was for the Board to make the ultimate decision as
to the status of a particular student.
The court made reference to the legislative history behind
HERRA, and focused on the language, and lack thereof, of the bill

first introduced.11 This bill contained no reference to students and
was subsequently amended to exclude students who worked less than
ten hours a week from coverage under HEERA.12 The final bill 13
eliminated this distinction and instead required case-by-case analysis
of the relationship between a student's educational objectives and his
or her employment. Because HEERA did not specifically exclude
house staff, the majority concluded that HEERA could, in fact, have
included them.
The dissent strongly argued that HEERA ought to be construed
like the National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter NLRA]14 which
has been interpreted in a number of cases to provide that interns and
residents are primarily students rather than employees.15 The majority opinion explained that section 3562(f) clearly indicated the legislature's intent to create new criteria for ascertaining house staff
employee status, rather than to incorporate the National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter NLRB] precedent and deny such status.
Further, "its creation of a statutory standard distinct from NLRB
precedent was intended to permit PERB to make an independent determination of the status of housestaff [sic]."16
11. Assem. Bill No. 1091 (1977-78 Reg. Sess.) (Mar. 24, 1977).
12. Assem. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 1091 (1977-78 Reg. Sess.) (May 23, 1977).
13. Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 1091 (1977-78 Reg. Sess.) (Aug. 7, 1978).
14. In 1935 Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69
(1976). This Act remains the cornerstone of labor relations policy and specifically
gives employees the right to "self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives . . . for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). The NLRA
created an administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), to enforce the statute.
15. St. Clare's Hospital, 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (May 26, 1977); Cedars-Sinai Medical
Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (Mar. 23, 1976).
16. Public Employment Relations Bd., 41 Cal. 3d at 609, 715 P.2d at 595, 224 Cal.
Rptr. at 636.

The court addressed the parallel construction of the two Acts by
distinguishing the facts. In the past, the NLRB cases addressing
house staff employee status focused on the house staff's subjective intent in participating in medical residency programs with little attention paid to the actual services performed. Using a "primary
purpose" test, the NLRB determined that a house staff's general purpose was scholastic rather than compensatory, and consequently refused to extend employee status. The NLRB concluded that students
employed by their own educational institutions either (1) in a capacity unrelated to their course of study or (2) in a capacity directly related to their educational program were not entitled to collectivebargaining rights.17
The majority concentrated on the language of section 3562 (f). This
section provides in part that:
The [B]oard may find student employees whose employment is contingent on
their status as students are employees only if the services they provide are unrelated to their educational objectives, or, that those educational objectives are

subordinate to the services they perform and
that coverage under this chapter
18
would further the purposes of this chapter.

Section 3562(f)'s language infers a similar classification scheme to
that which the NLRB uses, but the court stated that HEERA, as opposed to NLRA, "expressly permits PERB to find students in both
categories [outlined above] entitled to collective bargaining rights in
appropriate circumstances."' 9 "Thus, in defining 'employees' under
HEERA, the Legislature specifically rejected the NLRB rulings. ' 20
It was the later portion of section 3562(f) which governed this case:
"that those educational objectives are subordinate to the services
they perform and that coverage under this chapter would further the
purposes of this chapter." 21
The court concluded that under NLRB decisions, the issue was
whether the student's objectives were primarily educational, regardless of the services performed. Alternatively, under HERRA, the issues are whether the student's academic goals are subordinate to the
services provided, and if so, whether granting collective-bargaining
rights would further the purposes of HEERA regardless of the house
staff's educational motive. Hence, both the individual's goals and the
services performed must be considered.
The court reinforced its determination that HEERA did not intend
to exclude house staff from employee status consideration by refer17. St. Clare's Hospital, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1000-02.
18. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 3562(f) (West Supp. 1986).
19. Public Employment Relations Bd., 41 Cal. 3d at 612, 715 P.2d at 597, 224 Cal.
Rptr. at 638 (emphasis in original).

20. Id.
21. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(f) (West Supp. 1986).
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ring to section 3562(o)(1) of the California Government Code.22 This
section defines a "professional employee" which the court found to
clearly encompass house staff.
The court concluded that HEERA did not exclude house staff from
employee status consideration. Chief Justice Bird then turned to the
second issue: whether there was substantial evidence to support the
Board's decision that the house staff's educational objectives are
subordinate to the services rendered, and if so, whether granting
them collective-bargaining rights furthers the purposes of HEERA.
When reviewing an administrative judgment, the court has a duty
to act with deference. 2 3 HEERA requires that the Board's findings of
fact be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence on the record
as a whole. 24 Thus, judicial review is limited. In this case, the
Board's substantial evidence included the following: (1) the importance of patient care to the hospital, (2) the substantial time house
staff spent on direct patient care and outside clinical activities, 25 (3)
the amount of medical procedures performed without supervision,
and (4) specific characteristics of employment that identify house
staff as employees rather than students. 26 Based on the Board's evi22. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(o)(1) (West Supp. 1986) provides:
"Professional employee" means: (1) [a]ny employee engaged in work: (i) predominately intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine mental,
manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of
discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the
output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation
to a given period of time; and (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in
a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of
specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from
an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental,
manual, or physical processes.
Id.
23. PublicEmployment Relations Bd., 41 Cal. 3d at 617, 715 P.2d at 600-01, 224 Cal.
Rptr. at 641-42.
24. Id. at 617, 715 P.2d at 601, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 642. See also CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 3564(c) (West 1980).
25. More than 75 percent of an 80-100 hour week is usually spent in direct patient
care. Public Employment Relations Bd., 41 Cal. 3d at 619, 715 P.2d at 602, 224 Cal.
Rptr. at 643.
26. House staff are considered employees for tax purposes. Id. at 620 n.18, 715
P.2d at 602 n.18, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 643 n.18. House staff also receive fringe benefits including paid vacations and medical coverage. Id. at 620, 715 P.2d at 603, 224 Cal. Rptr.
at 644. In addition, house staff pay no tuition or student fees, do not take University
examinations on a regular basis, receive no grades and receive no degrees upon completion of the program. Id. It is interesting to note, however, that house staff are eligible for financial aid and, for purposes of such aid, their status is that of students
enabling them to defer payment of the loan.

dence, the court deferred to the Board's finding that educational
objectives are subordinate to the services they perform.
In determining whether according house staff collective-bargaining
rights would further the purposes of HEERA, the court focused on
the legislative intent behind HEERA. "In enacting HEERA, the
Legislature found that the people of this state 'have a fundamental
interest in the development of harmonious and cooperative labor
relations between the public institutions of higher education and
their employees.' "27 Wages, hours, and working conditions are substantial employment concerns, which the court held "are manifestly
amenable to collective negotiations and have a direct and primary impact on the employment relationship of housestaff [sic] with the
28
University."
The University argued that according house staff collective-bargaining rights may lead to strikes. Rejecting this contention, the
court emphasized the widely accepted holding in San Diego Teacher
Association v. Superior Court 29 that collective-bargaining rights are
an alternative dispute resolution mechanism which diminish the
probability that vital services will be interrupted. 30 The court
thereby affirmed the Board's determination that by allowing house
staff collective-bargaining rights, the purposes of HEERA would be
furthered because house staff could directly partake in the determination of their working environment and such rights would provide a
viable mechanism for resolving disputes.
IV.

THE DISSENTING OPINION

3

Justice Lucas ' contended in a separate dissenting opinion that the
Board abused its discretion by inadequately interpreting section
3562(f). The majority, he argued, added to this error by interpreting
the plain meaning of section 3562(f) to create a "substantial evidence" test.32 Justice Lucas believed that the California Legislature
enacted section 3562(f) to define "employees" consistent with the language contained in the NLRA. Therefore, following NLRB precedent, the "primary purpose" test should have been invoked, rather
than the "substantial evidence" test. The appropriate disposition of
27. Public Employment Relations Bd., 41 Cal. 3d at 622, 715 P.2d at 604, 224 Cal.
Rptr. at 645. See also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3560(a) (West Supp. 1986).
28. Public Employment Relations Bd., 41 Cal. 3d at 622, 715 P.2d at 604, 224 Cal.

Rptr. at 645.
29. 24 Cal. 3d 1, 593 P.2d 838, 154 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1979).
30. Id. at 8-9, 13, 593 P.2d at 843, 846, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 898, 901.
31. Justice Campbell Lucas is an Associate Justice of the court of appeal, second
appellate district, assigned to the supreme court by the Chairperson of the Judicial
Council.
32. Public Employment Relations Bd., 41 Cal. 3d at 624-25, 715 P.2d at 606, 224 Cal.
Rptr. at 646 (C. Lucas, J., dissenting).
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the case, therefore, should have been to issue a Writ of Mandate ordering the Board to vacate its decision and issue a new decree.
Justice Lucas concentrated on NLRB disputes, which held house
staff to be "students" rather than "employees." He argued that even
though the house staff in these cases also showed indicia of employment and similar resident activities which the Board found determinative in this case, these factors were irrelevant in ultimately
determining house staff employee status.
33
Quoting the NLRB's findings in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center,
Justice Lucas purported to explain his position: "[i]nterns, residents
and clinical fellows are primarily engaged in graduate educational
training... their status is therefore that of students rather than employees ....

They participate in these programs not for the purpose

of earning a living... [but] to pursue the graduate medical education
that is a requirement for the practice of medicine ....

Their choice

[of program is] based on the quality of the educational program," and
not on the salary provided. 34 Furthermore, Justice Lucas believed
that national labor policy precluded the extension of collective-bargaining rights to these individuals.
While Justice Lucas agreed with the majority opinion that subdivision (f) permits the Board to deviate from NLRB precedent and find
particular students to fall within HEERA, he believed that house
staff are not such students. Justice Lucas believed that HEERA
clearly dictated that the student's educational objectives and intention in rendering the services required should be the primary focus
rather than the majority's view of weighing educational objectives
against services performed. Moreover, Justice Lucas criticized the
Board's emphasis on a student's educational benefits when the statute specifically requires analysis of a student's educational objectives,
not benefits.35 Under the majority's approach, the "substantive evidence" test affirms the Board's administrative decision that services
performed outweigh educational objectives, according house staff collective-bargaining rights. Under Justice Lucas' approach, the "primary purpose" test found that scholastic motive outweighed
economic motive, denying house staff collective-bargaining rights.
33. 233 N.L.R.B. 251 (Mar. 23, 1976).
34. Public Employment Relations Bd., 41 Cal. 3d at 629, 715 P.2d at 609, 224 Cal.
Rptr. at 649-50 (C. Lucas, J., dissenting) (quoting Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223
N.L.R.B. at 253).
35. Public Employment RelationsBd., 41 Cal. 3d at 649-50, 715 P.2d at 623, 224 Cal.
Rptr. at 664 (C. Lucas, J., dissenting).

V.

CONCLUSION

Chief Justice Bird's holding that medical house staff are employees
entitled to collective-bargaining rights was in direct conflict with the
NLRB precedent. The issue was really one of semantics. While
HEERA may justify this analysis of section 3562(f), according house
staff the right to bargain with their employer-hospital may prove deleterious to the high standard of medical care presently provided to
their patients.
ARIAN COLACHIS

VIII.

TORTS
A. If special circumstances are present, machinery owners
owe a duty of due care to third persons, to protect
against injuriesoccuring as a result of the vehicle's
operation: Ballard v. Uribe.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Ballard v. Uribe,' the California Supreme Court held that a machinery owner owed a duty of care to prevent injury to third persons
resulting from the operation of a vehicle, upon a finding that special
circumstances were present. In doing so, the court sidestepped addressing the Richards v. Stanley 2 rule of nonliability and reaffirmed
the utility of the special circumstances exception. The court declined
to address the issue of juror misconduct giving rise to verdict impeachment by finding an insufficient record upon which to review.
II.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

The defendant and the plaintiff were both employed by the Guy F.
Atkinson Company at the time of the December 1975 injury. The defendant performed services as a subcontractor. These services included bringing his aerial manlift to the construction site. 3 The
defendant noticed in November or December of 1975 that the stabilizing cable, attached to the basket in which workmen were raised and
lowered, was "frayed and broken."4 In anticipation of his absence
1. 41 Cal. 3d 564, 715 P.2d 624, 224 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1986). Justice Grodin wrote for
the court with Justices Broussard and Reynoso concurring. Separate concurrences
were authored by Justices Mosk and Lucas. Chief Justice Bird wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
2. 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954). See Note, Torts: The Key in the Ignition and
California's "Special Circumstances" Doctrine,38 S. CAL. L. REV. 125 (1965). See also
5 WEST'S CALIFORNIA DIGEST 2D Automobiles §§ 173(8), 192(1) (1981).
3. Ballard, 41 Cal. 3d at 568, 715 P.2d at 625-26, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
4. Id. at 569, 715 P.2d at 626, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
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from the site, he contacted Atkinson's project manager, Boli, for permission to leave the lift in Atkinson's fenced yard until his return.
A conflict in testimony arose at this point. Boli testified that he
asked the defendant for permission to use the equipment and, after
being informed of the defect, offered to have it repaired. He further
stated that the defendant agreed to its use after repair. The defendant, however, stated that he "never gave permission," but on another
5
occasion admitted giving permission for use after repair.
The defendant failed to lock the control box, left keys in both engines, and did not post warning signs as to the defect. 6 Atkinson's

mechanic testified that he removed the broken cable and was awaiting a replacement part when the injury occurred. On December 11,
1975, the plaintiff used the aerial manlift, unaware of its defective
7
condition, and was ejected, suffering injuries.
The issues were bifurcated, separating the determinations as to liability and damages. The trial court instructed the jury on two alternative theories of liability. At trial, the jury found for the plaintiff
on the issue of liability, and a second jury awarded the plaintiff
$200,000 in damages. The defendant appealed the liability determina8
tion and the plaintiff cross appealed the award of damages.
III.

ANALYSIS

The court was confronted with two issues requiring resolution.
First, given these facts, must a duty of due care be imposed upon a
vehicle owner, owing to a third party, when special circumstances exist, creating a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm resulting from operation of the vehicle? Second, is impeachment of a jury verdict
proper under these circumstances?
The court began its analysis by addressing the defendant's first
contention of error, namely the issuance of two separate jury instructions. Instruction one 9 explained the duty of care applicable to a
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. There was disputed testimony as to whether the mechanic, following removal
of the cable, "tied down" the basket to compensate for the missing part. Id. at 570 n.1,
715 P.2d at 626 n.1, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 667 n.1.
8. Id. at 568, 715 P.2d at 625, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
9. The bailor/bailee instruction read in pertinent part:
When one gives possession and the right to use personal property to another
and the latter agrees to return the same property to him at a future time, the
transaction is known in law as a bailment .... The bailor has a duty to those
whom he should expect to use the property ....

bailor-bailee relationship, specifically in situations where "one gives
possession and the right to use personal property of another."10 The
second instruction1 1 dealt with situations involving unauthorized use
and imposed a duty if special circumstances were present. The court
found both instructions were warranted, basing its determination
upon the defendant's presentation of contradictory evidence as to his
granting of use privileges.
The court next addressed the defendant's contention that the "special circumstances" doctrine was inapposite to the facts in this case,
and as such should not have been used to instruct the jury on the
principles of liability involving unauthorized use.12 This doctrine
arose as an exception to Richards v. Stanley,13 which established that
a defendant owed no duty to "protect plaintiff from harm resulting
from the activities of third persons ....-14 The case involved the
theft of the defendant's automobile following her failure to remove
the keys, which resulted in injury to a third person. Richards alluded to the possibility that such a duty may be imposed.
In a series of cases following the Richards decision, the court began
to carve out exceptions that allowed the imposition of this duty upon
a vehicle owner. Richardson v. Ham,15 held that "[t]he extreme danger created . .. and the foreseeable risk of intermeddling fully justiffies] imposing a duty on the owner to exercise reasonable care to
protect third parties from injury .... 16 Richardson involved the unauthorized use of bulldozers by youths resulting from the defendant's
failure to adequately lock the ignition system. Hergenrether v.
East,17 held that the issue of the existence of special circumstances
Id. at 570 n.2, 715 P.2d at 627 n.2, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 667 n.2.
10. Id. at 571, 715 P.2d at 627, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 668 (emphasis in original).
11. Special Instruction Number 5 stated in pertinent part:
In the absence of special circumstances an owner of a vehicle has no duty to
control the conduct of third persons resulting from the keys having been left
in the vehicle.
However, where the owner knew or should have known of special circumstances which create a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm from the use or
operation of the vehicle, if the keys are left in the vehicle, then the owner of
the vehicle has a duty to use reasonable care to protect the general public
from such risks.
Id. at 571 n.3, 715 P.2d at 627 n.3, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 667-68 n.3.
12. Id. at 572, 715 P.2d at 628-29, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 668-69.
13. 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954). See Annot., 51 A.L.R. 2d 633 (1953); Annot.,
92 A.L.R. 2d 1326 (1963); Annot., 45 A.L.R. 3d 787 (1972).
14. Richards, 43 Cal. 2d at 66, 271 P.2d at 27.
15. 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955). See 46 CAL. JUR. 3D Negligence § 13 (1978);
8 CAL. JUR. 3D Automobiles § 450 (1973). See also 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts, §§ 490, 545, 645 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
16. Richardson, 44 Cal. 2d at 776, 285 P.2d at 271.
17. 61 Cal. 2d 440, 393 P.2d 164, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1964). See Note, Torts: Negligence:
Car Owner Leaving Key in Vehicle has a Duty to Third Person Injured by Thief, 12
UCLA L. REV. 1260 (1965); Note, Torts: Owner's Liability - Leaving Ignition Keys in
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should be determined by considering each case on its own facts, and
if the foreseeable risk of harm was unreasonable, the owner owed a
duty of due care to third persons to prevent injurious conduct.' 8 In
Palma v. U.S. IndustrialFasteners,Inc.,19 the court reversed a summary judgment and remanded the case, noting that factors which established a duty in Hergenrether, were also present in the case at
hand.20 Further, the court specified that the conclusion drawn in
Hergenrethermay be appropriate, specifically that "a foreseeable risk
of harm was posed by the truck left with its keys in the ignition...
warranting imposition of a duty on the owner... to... third persons
"21

The court found that the facts presented in this case fit squarely
within the special circumstances exception, finding Richardson established that "the significant danger posed by the unauthorized use of
heavy construction machinery warrants recognition of a duty on the
part of machinery owners to use due care to prevent the injurious
misuse of the machinery by others." 22 The application of this doctrine to the owner of an aerial manlift is analogous to its application
in Richardson, where the vehicle involved was a bulldozer. The defendant's contention that the facts were distinguishable and thus no
duty should be imposed was without merit. The fact that he left the
machinery in a fenced area did not negate the general duty that attached. The court found that minimizing the potential injury to a
third person was a factor by which the jury could find the defendant
not negligent, but not the basis for finding that no duty was owing. 23
The court discussed the functional roles of both the trial court and
jury in applying the special circumstances exception. 24 The court
Unattended and Unlocked Vehicle: Hergenrether v. East, 5
(1964).

SANTA CLARA

L. REV. 91

18. Hergenrether,61 Cal. 2d at 445, 393 P.2d at 167, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
19. 36 Cal. 3d 171, 681 P.2d 893, 203 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1984). The facts in Palma,
analogous to those in Hergenretherthat led to a finding of special circumstances, in-

cluded: (a) area where the vehicle was left, (b) intent for vehicle to remain for extended period of time, (c) keys left in ignition, and (d) the fact that the ability to safely

operate the vehicle was not common knowledge to many. Id.
20. Id. at 185, 681 P.2d at 902, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
21. Id.
22. Ballard, 41 Cal. 3d at 573, 715 P.2d at 629, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 669.

23. Id.
24. The parameters of the jury and court in regard to the special circumstances
exception in Richardson and Hergenretherbecome confused because of the foreseeability factor. Foreseeability of harm is a factor to be utilized by the court in making a
general finding whether the "negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result
in the kind of harm experienced ... [,]" thus imposing a duty. Whereas, the foresee-

agreed with the defendant's contention that Richardson and
Hergenrether offer guidance as to when a duty arises, an issue to be
determined by the court, not the jury. However, the court found that
the trial court's error in submitting the issue of duty to the jury was
25
not prejudicial, as the defendant had a clearly established duty.
The defendant's final contention, that there was insufficient evidence
to support a finding of negligence and that the trial court erred in
26
submitting this issue to the jury, was found to be unsubstantiated.
In reaching all issues presented, the court addressed plaintiff's
cross appeal. The plaintiff alleged juror misconduct, and requested
impeachment of the jury verdict. The court held that the plaintiff
failed to provide an adequate record upon which to review the trial
court's finding. Thus, no further consideration as to the merits of
this contention was required. 27 All three supporting opinions found
this issue ripe for discussion.
IV.

CONCURRENCES AND DISSENTS

Justice Mosk, concurring, strongly criticized the "incipient trend
...of losing parties attempting to impeach jury verdicts." 28 He distinguished juror affidavits offered in support of impeachment as representative of two different concerns, either subjective or objective.
Allowing jurors to attest to subjective concerns, as a basis for jury
misconduct and impeachment, "would be a grave disservice to the integrity of the jury system ... "29 He stated that People v. Hutchinson3 O was binding, which held that "jurors are competent witnesses
to prove objective facts to impeach a verdict . . . . ,,3 Objective facts
are exemplified by the following: a) the intrusion of the bailiff into
deliberation, 32 b) an alternate juror sitting with the deliberating jurors, 33 c) the foreman contacting an attorney for advice,34 and d) a
ability issue within the province of the jury relates to "focused, fact-specific settings,"
looking specifically to the actions of the plaintiff and defendant. Id. at 572-73 n.6, 715
P.2d at 628-29 n.6, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 669 n.6.
25. Id. at 572-73, 715 P.2d at 628-29, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
26. Id. at 573-74, 715 P.2d at 629, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 670.

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 574-75, 715 P.2d at 629-30, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
Id. at 575, 715 P.2d at 630, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 670 (Mosk, J., concurring).
Id. at 577, 715 P.2d at 632, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 672 (Mosk, J., concurring).
71 Cal. 2d 342, 455 P.2d 132, 78 Cal. Rptr. 196, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 994 (1969).

31. Ballard, 41 Cal. 3d at 575-76, 715 P.2d at 630-31, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 671 (Mosk, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original) (quoting People v. Hutchinson, 71 Cal. 2d 342, 351,
455 P.2d 132, 137-38, 78 Cal. Rptr. 196, 201-02 (1969)).
32. Hutchinson, 71 Cal. 2d at 351, 455 P.2d at 137-38, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 201-02.
33. People v. Valles, 24 Cal. 3d 121, 123, 593 P.2d 240, 240-41, 154 Cal. Rptr. 543,
543-44 (1979).
34. People v. Honeycutt, 20 Cal. 3d 150, 154-55, 570 P.2d 1050, 1051-52, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 698, 699 (1977).
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35
juror providing instruction as to the law.

Justice Lucas concurred with Justice Mosk, but restated his disagreement with the holding in In re Stankewitz, 36 which found juror
misconduct and held that one juror's providing instruction as to the
law was an "objective concern."
Chief Justice Bird, in a lengthy dissent, affirmed the majority's
holding that the trial court did not err in giving alternative instructions. 37 Finding that the record contained sufficient evidence to indicate either authorized or unauthorized use, instructions in the
alternative were proper.
In a historical progression, the Chief Justice analyzed and distinguished the nonliability doctrine arising out of Richards v. Stanley,
and its progeny that carved out the special circumstances exception.
She concluded that resolution in this case did not require ascertaining the continuing viability of the Richards rule, noting, however,
that "if the question were squarely presented ... I [C.J. Bird] would
overrule the Richards no-duty rule."38
In finding the special circumstances doctrine inapplicable, she distinguished the facts presented in this case from those in the cases
that developed the doctrine. Specifically, this case involved: a) a risk
of harm arising from a hidden defect, b) a plaintiff that is the operator, not a third party injured as a result of an operator's negligence,
c) a plaintiff that is not a thief, and d) the defendant could foresee a
risk of harm to the plaintiff, whereas in prior cases no foreseeable
risk existed, "absent the intervening negligence of a third party." 39
The Chief Justice repudiated the Richards analysis to the extent that
findings of "foreseeability of the risk" and "unreasonableness of the
risk" are treated as separate determinations.40
Launching into the second issue of the plaintiff's cross appeal, the
Chief Justice, finding juror misconduct, stated that "the presumption
of a prejudice requires reversal of that portion of the judgment re35. In re Stankewitz, 40 Cal. 3d 391, 396, 708 P.2d 1260, 1261, 220 Cal. Rptr. 382, 383
(1985), modified, 41 Cal. 3d 439(a) (1986).
36. Id.
37. Ballard, 41 Cal. 3d at 589, 715 P.2d at 640, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 680 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
38. Id. at 586 n.11, 715 P.2d at 638 n.11, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 678 n.11 (Bird, C.J., con-

curring and dissenting).
39. Id. at 587, 715 P.2d at 638-39, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 679 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
40. Id. at 588-89, 715 P.2d at 640, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 680 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).

flecting the verdict for damages. .. ."41 She asserted that the affidavits presented created a rebuttable presumption of prejudice which
neither the defendant nor the reviewing court rebutted and, thus, a
new trial should ensue. She discounted the majority's reliance on insufficient record by finding that the plaintiff's attorney's statements
regarding voir dire were an effective substitute for transcripts.4 2 In
conclusion, the Chief Justice addressed the issues presented in Justice Mosk's concurring opinion.
V.

IMPACT

The majority opinion does little more than add to the list of "exceptions" to the non-liability doctrine established in Richards. It also
refrained from addressing the tempting issue of "verdict impeachment." In taking a middle-of-the-road approach to both issues, the
court avoids controversy yet does little to enhance the state of the
law in either area.
PAMELA JOAN MINETTO

B. Absent legislative authority to create an independent
action for malicious orfrivolous appealfor the
purpose of delay, an aggrieved party's remedy is
contained in section 907 of the Civil Procedure Code:
Coleman v. Gulf Insurance Group.
The plaintiffs in Coleman v. Gulf Insurance Group, 41 Cal. 3d 782,
718 P.2d 77, 226 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986), obtained a $350,000 judgment
against the City of Monrovia [hereinafter the City] for a wrongful
death action. Subsequently, the City, who was insured by Gulf Insurance Group, appealed the lower court's decision; during the pendency
of that appeal, however, the parties settled for a reduced amount of
$300,000. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed suit for frivolous appeal, asserting that the City knew an appeal would be unsuccessful, but filed
the appeal in order to delay payment and force the plaintiffs to settle.
Thereafter, plaintiffs attempted to create a new and separate action
for malicious appeal instigated for the purpose of delay supported by
four legal theories: (1) abuse of process, (2) malicious prosecution of
appeal, (3) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (4)
violation of section 790.03(h)(5) of the Insurance Code. Heretofore,
an action for malicious appeal based on these contentions had never
been recognized.
41. Id. at 595-96, 715 P.2d at 645, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 685 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
42. Id. at 593-94, 715 P.2d at 642-43, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 683 (Bird, C.J., concurring
and dissenting).
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The court declared that malicious filing of an appeal for the purpose of delay subjects the appellant to legislatively created sanctions.
Section 907 of the Civil Procedure Code provides the following:
"When it appears to the reviewing court that the appeal was frivolous
or taken solely for delay .... [the appellate court] may add to the
costs on appeal such damages as may be just." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 907 (West 1980). Since the plaintiffs failed to assert section 907 at
the beginning or during the pendency of the defendant's appeal, the
plaintiffs were denied further damages.
The court relied on its earlier decision in In re Marriage of Maherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 646 P.2d 179, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1982), which
focused on the difficulty in discerning frivolous appeals from nonfrivolous appeals. In an effort to gauge damages to avoid the deterrence
of legitimate appeals, the court in Flaherty emphasized that the appellate judge is in the best position to assess the unworthiness of the
appeal. Based on its decision in Flaherty, the court determined that
this independent action requested by the plaintiffs would require the
imposition of a lay jury whose decision would be inferior to that of
the appellate judge where the alleged meritless appeal was originally
filed.
Next, the court established that the plaintiffs' first proposed theory
for abuse of process was without merit. A cause of action for abuse
of process requires an improper motive and a willful act committed
in an unlawful manner. The court sustained plaintiffs' proof of the
first element, finding that defendant's ulterior motive in filing the
appeal was to delay payment of the judgment and subsequently settle
for less. The court, however, rejected plaintiffs' contention as to the
second element and held that the defendant merely exercised his
right to appeal by using the process for its proper purpose in an authorized manner.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' second alternative theory for malicious prosecution of appeal. One essential element for the tort of
malicious prosecution is that the prior action be instigated by or at
the direction of the present defendant. However, the holding in Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 184 (1974), seemed to suggest that a malicious cross-complaint
by a defendant in the original action could be subject to this tort.
The court distinguished this case from Bertero by stating that "cross
pleadings are treated as distinct and independent actions," while an
appeal is not a separate proceeding, but rather "the continuation of

an attempt 'to repel' plaintiff's attack." Coleman, 41 Cal. 3d at 794,
718 P.2d at 83, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
The plaintiffs' third argument stated that the defendant's insurance company breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
implied by law in every insurance contract. The court quickly rejected the plaintiffs' claim and stated that since the plaintiffs were
not the contracting parties, but rather independent third parties, an
action could not be sustained.
The last argument presented was that the plaintiffs' claim should
be supported by section 790.03(h)(5) of the Insurance Code. This section places a duty on an insurer to attempt in good faith to settle
claims in which liability is "reasonably clear." CAL. INS. CODE
§ 790.03(h)(5) (West Supp. 1986). The court held that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to maintain this claim since liability had already
been established when the plaintiffs' judgment was rendered. The
court contended that this section applied only to an insurer's prejudgment actions.
After thorough analysis of the theories presented by the plaintiffs
to create an independent action and thereby avoid the statutory sanctions already available, the supreme court concluded that the plaintiffs' theories could not be sustained and that their sole remedy for a
frivolous appeal lay in section 907 of the Civil Procedure Code.
ARIAN COLACHIS

